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PREFACE 
This Working Paper contains the papers from the 1987 American 
Ethnological Society invited session, "Author Meets Critics: Sherry 
Ortner and Theory in Anthropology," held at the American Anthropological 
Association Meetings in Chicago. The session proposal (written, I 
believe, by the AES Program Chair, Katherine Verdery) read as follows: 
In 1984, Sherry Ortner published a paper entitled "Theory in 
Anthropology since the 1960ts," offering an ambitious overview of 
the directions recent theorizing has taken and in which she would 
like to encourage it further.* The paper stimulated immediate 
comment and has continued to generate discussion, disagreement, 
reformulations, and refinements. Given her rightly pointing to 
the theoretical disarray in our field and the potential utility of 
further pursuing her proposals to reduce it, Ortner's views 
deserve a wider public discussion in hopes of building momentum 
for a theoretical refocusing in anthropology - the objective of 
this session. 
The papers have been subjected to only minor editorial revisions. 
Collier and Yanagisako's paper will be published in Critiaue of 
~thr0~010uv. My "Response" has become, with some revisions, part of 
the Introduction to &&I Reliaion (Princeton University Press 1989). 
Due to technological limitations, we regret that we have had to omit 
accent marks throughout the text. 
I wish to thank Stephanie Moore and Rachael Cohen for technical support, 
and particularly Larry Frohman who did the bulk of the word processing 
and general junk work associated with getting this large Working Paper 
out. 
Sherry B. Ortner 
* Sherry B. Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology Since the sixties." 
Darative Studies in Societv and History 26:l (1984), pp 126-66. 
by 
Maurice Bloch 
Department of Social Anthropology 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Ortner's paper of 1984 is a real feat. It gives the best overview of 
the period available in clear simple language. By and large it is fair and 
sympathetic towards the authors discussed. It is stimulating and thought 
provoking. My comments here are, however, largely critical. This is because 
there is no point in stressing the obvious: the service Ortner has done to the 
profession in writing the article; but also because her viewpoint is so 
fundamentally challenging and thought provoking. Any anthropologist who does 
not want to tell her story her way, after reading Ortner, is not worth her 
salt. 
Ortner tells us that she has chosen to concentrate on the period in 
anthropology 'since the sixties' because that is when she started as an 
anthropologist. Indeed there are many other good reasons for doing so. But 
there are also dangers in identifying oneself too closely with such a 
historical survey. Ironically she discusses these herself at the end of the 
paper when she reviews actor centred theories of history. In particular what 
is emerging in a number of recent anthropological and historical stud-ies is-, 
d 
that actors are very poor at evaluating their role and that of their 
contemporaries in forming events. Either they tend to underestimate their 
innovativeness, like the maddening informants who explain everything that is 
done by telling you that this is how the ancestors did it, or they tend to 
overestimate it, like those other, largely western, informants who explain 
everything as being simply caused by personal inner desires. These two types 
of informants are like those cultural and social anthropologists who either 
believe the system is king, or like the transactionalists who see everything 
in terms of "actors" and intentionality. I shall return to this point, but 
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here I would like to note that these different attitudes tend to yield very 
contrasting images of the past. In the first case it is believed that not 
much seems to happen ever, in the second everything seems to be changing at a 
terrifying rate, at the whim and fancy of individualistic subjects. 
I feel that Ortner tends to be this second kind of peculiarly western 
and more specifically American informant. The value of such an approach and 
the energies it creates are immense, but coming from a somewhat different 
background I find myself reacting dialectically to such a view. I too began 
anthropology at much the same time as Ortner and reading her historical 
account makes me feel retrospectively exhausted at being told'that I have been- 
through so much. Indeed this is a bit like the impression I get when I come 
to the U.S.A. where I believe there is an exaggerated tendency to stress the 
demise of what was done in the past, (hence the inevitable announcement of a 
crisis) and the discovery of a new theory, when in fact we are merely dealing 
with a shift in interest to a new area of enquiry, such as symbolism which 
became "symbolic anthropology", or more recently an examination of the 
production of ethnography which became "reflexive anthropology". These new 
"theories" rapidly gain such reification that advertisements soon appear for 
posts for these new kinds of anthropologists. Such brittle response to 
fashion has a lot to do with the professional organisation of American 
universities and also, dare I say it, with a view that political and moral 
commitment is more a form of self expression than anything else. 
And so as a bewildered foreigner I react against this image of recent 
history and exaggerate the other way so that I pretend to feel appalled that 
nothing has advanced. This is what I shall do here. In fact both views are 
misleading but Ortner gives too much of the first and that leads her to 
conclusions which are in part unacceptable and so, to balance her position, I 
shall take thetopposite tack. 
As an example let us look at her discussion of the influence of Marxism. 
For Ortner Marxism is very much "a ship which arrived in the night" in the 
late nineteen sixties, but this must seem a very strange view to older 
Americans and Europeans. 
This view of Marxism as emerging out of nowhere is especially puzzling 
when Ortner discusses the stream which she calls the "political economy" 
school. However defined, the issues which she sees as characterising this 
school go back to the beginning of this century at least, as the writings of 
Lenin and Luxemburg bear witness. Subsequently to this pioneering period 
these problems were then analyzed in the works of a large number of anti- 
colonial leaders in Asia and Africa. These views concerning the determining 
influence of world capitalism on the nature of African and Asian societies 
were principally formulated in the political arena but they were also very 
influential among professional first world anthropologists in France (Boiteau, 
Leiris, even Balandier), in Britain (~orsley) and in the U.S.A. (wolf). 
The importance and influence of this approach is shown in part by the 
reaction and evolution it caused, precisely the kind of reaction which 
Ortner would like to see. This occurred in the form of an attempt which 
theoretically took into account the combination of the growing domination of a 
world economic system and the specificity of endocentric socio-cultural 
processes. The search for such a theory developed in France in articles which 
began to appear in the journal Presence Africaine and subsequently developed 
in the work of such anthropologists as Suret-Canale, Meillassoux and Terray 
who attempted to develop theories about the articulation of modes of 
production inspired in part by the work of Althusser and in part by politico- 
'-3. 
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economic circumstances. Perhaps such models were unnecessarily mechanical and 
smelled of false realism but the problem is not new and the questions which 
anthropologists have asked and are asking are inscribed in this much longer 
term debate. 
Admittedly there have been many new developments and political economy 
has gained, for example, from economic geography and history in the U.S.A. as 
it has in-France and Britain. But, "political economy" did not begin "since 
the sixties" or in a context limited either to universities or anthropology. 
I do not think much can be understood about it by pretending that it did. The 
painful theoretical progress which has been made during this century and which 
continues, of which the work to which Ortner refers is a little part, is 
liable to be wasted by anthropologists with such an approach. Furthermore 
there is no reason to think "political economy" will run out of steam even if 
totally new fashions turn up in the academic American community. The issues 
which have shaped the world economy this century have perhaps changed but they 
have not gone away and anybody who knows the countries in which most 
anthropologists' work is carried out will know how bizarre is the idea that we 
live in a "post modern world." In any case new and innovative studies in this 
tradition have continued coming out since the Ortner article as the work of 
Carol Smith and Verdery among others show. In spite of wishing they did, 
academic anthropologists do not live in a closed world where they can change 
the laws of physics simply because they have got bored with them. 
Similar points can be made concerning Ortner's view of structuralism and 
especially "structural Marxism". The criticism she directs against it, and her 
call for a "practice orientationtt seem also to forget much of the history of 
the subject where the issue has always been central. If we forget how we got 
there we condemn ourselves to just going backwards and forwards on the same 
spot. 
In Marxism the role of the individual, of group practice and of praxis 
in supra individual processes has alwavs been the central theoretical issue of 
Marxism since its inception in Heselianism and all the major rifts in Marxism 
have concerned precisely this matter. The history of Marxism will show this 
(~ichtheim <1961> is particularly good here, also see Bloch <1983>). 
The following brief account will suggest how these issues are part of an 
ongoing debate which anthropologists ignore at their peril. Hegelianism was 
originally a response to the pseudo-individualism of utilitarians and in 
Marxism this was extended to a criticism of classical economists and their 
notions of choice and freedom. A response to this position was various- forms 
of existentialism of which the pre-war existentialism of Sartre is an example. 
This was a response to Marxist theories of history which at that time were 
lurching towards mechanistic models of society. Sartre's work became the 
dialectic base for Althusser's and above all for Levi-Strauss's structuralism. 
When these reactions became developed into a theory of history they were 
explicitly a challenge to Sartrean voluntarism and cannot be understood 
outside this context. 
I go over this well known history because without it we are likely to 
misunderstand its products and this is what has happened in the way Levi- 
Strauss was seen both in Britain and the U.S.A. Ortner, like Harris and Leach 
before her, seem mystified by Levi-Strauss's claim to be a Marxist, but that 
is.because they forget the historical context out of which his work arises. 
In many ways Levi-Strauss represents a modified return to the most fundamental 
notions of Marx, that is that culture exists not as a state.but in the process 
of dialectical transformation. As Gibson points out nothing could be more 
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different from this than the static and innatist theories of the likes of 
Needham and Dumont. 
In fact Levi-Strauss's work is first and foremost a theory of historical 
change and is part of a largely Marxist long term debate on the role of 
individual practice and agency in history. Admittedly Levi-Strauss attributes 
little determinative historical significance to individual practice, but that 
is because like Marx he believes that the disjunction between individual 
desire and social dialectic is a product of a particular phase in our history, 
not the basis for theory, and in this Levi-Strauss rejoins Althusser. 
This Marxist-structuralist debate was inevitably continued by the 
writers who Ortner labels as "structural Marxist" who refer back to Althusser 
and Levi-Strauss among.others. And so the concern with practice has remained 
centre stage. For example Terray discussed how the exploitation by elders is 
experienced by the Abron as a form of interlineal antagonism and how it leads 
to actions directed by this perception (~erray 1975). But at the same time 
the Hegelian Marxist conflation of historical and individual practice was 
itself proving too simple and a number of writers were turning to other 
earlier participants in this dialogue, among them anthropologists. Godelier 
discussed the problems in Levi-Strauss's radical dissociation of intention and 
effect in his theory of myth (~odelier 1971). For my part I gave in 1976 
 l loch 1977) a lecture which was entirely devoted to some of the issues raised 
by practice in Marxism and anthropology and which was intended to bring into 
the forum of anthropology some of the discussions on this matter by non- 
anthropologists, e.g. Lukacs and Thompson. In particular I drew attention in 
this paper to the dangers of equating culture with ideology because of the 
implication such an equation would have for the possibility of change. I have 
gone on at length on this matter elsewhere (e.9. "From Cognition to Ideology" 
I ' 
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1985) and Godelier has made the same point elsewhere (1984). I feel therefore 
a little aggrieved of being accused by ortner's paper twice of equating 
culture with ideology in an article which is centrally concerned with arguing 
the opposite, and of falling into the trap which such an equation would imply, 
that of making historically significant action impossible, when in fact I was 
pointing out that indeed this would be the inevitable effect of such a 
misleading equation. 
Now that I have got this off my chest let me return to the main point. 
That is that Marxist theory has always been Centrally concerned with the issue 
of practice and praxis and that there.is nothing to be gained and much to be 
lost in seeing "practice anthropology" as a new fashion. Of course this is 
not to say that it is not very useful to remind people of this old and central 
issue, but pretending that something dramatically new is being born runs the 
risk that we shall waste all the important work that has already been done in 
advancing and defining the issues and that we shall entangle ourselves in 
brambles which have already been cleared. 
An example of such brambles is transactionalism. This was a theory 
which appeared in Britain in the fifties and which was in its dying throes in 
the first part of the period Ortner discusses. It took a number of forms such 
as those found in the earlier work of Barth, Bailey, Barnes and others and 
appeared as "formalism" in economic anthropology. Basically it sought to 
explain socio-cultural situations as the products of a cumulation of 
individual maximisation. Soon, however, it was realised that explanations of 
actions as the product of hypothesised desires were neither interesting, nor 
psychologically believable; nor did they provide explanations of those 
desires, or of the conditions in which they were formulated and acted upon.. 
In response transactionalist theories were modified so as to exclude from 
explanation ever more factors, which were simply to be considered as "givens" 
(values in ~arth), but then, of course, there was nothing left of interest 
that was being dealt with.....and so transactionalism faded away. 
Transactionalism was a waste of time precisely because its protagonists seem 
to have been unaware how such theories had already been demonstrated again and 
again to be misleading, by Keynes in Economics, by Kant, Hegel and many others 
in philosophy, and most importantly by Marx in his demonstration of the 
historical specificity of the idea of maximising choice and of its unsoundness 
when it was separated from historical process. In other words the 
transactionalist went back to a philosophkcal starting point somewhere in the 
middle of the eighteenth Century without being aware of their own regression. 
Now the point of mentioning this tendency is that I find to my horror that it 
is seen by Ortner as one of the precursors of "practice anthropology." If 
that is indeed an indication of what this new movement will be, the course of 
its life can be predicted: it will be short and nasty. 
But in fact the fate of being born dead is not as necessary for 
"practice anthropology" as the association with transactionalism would 
suggest. This excursion into the long term history of social science can also 
enable us to point towards a more fruitful direction and I believe this 
direction is also suggested by Ortner. However, it is not something different 
but the continuation of a theoretical enterprise which is not limited to 
anthropology, but to which anthropology has made a significant contribution. 
The trouble is that Ortner is very vague, not surprisingly as she is 
setting herself a formidable task, and this vagueness is reflected in the 
difficulty she has in finding a proper name for her recipe: practice, praxis, 
action, study of the everyday, etc... This is not surprising since it is "the 
study of all forms of human action." Ortner is aware that this may be a 
little wide, and so she adds a qualification: it will be human action seen 
"from a particular-political angle;" but she is also forced to recognise that 
"almost anything people do has such implications". At this point some of you 
might be tempted to fear that the real problem is that the emerging practice 
anthropology is totally continuous with the primeval slime which surrounds 
it......but this would be a pity. 
The reason why this would be a pity is because she has identified what I 
feel is a most serious development in anthropology, but like her I find it 
difficult to put my finger on it. Like her I would attempt to do this by 
first looking back but I would look further back. Especially I would look 
back to what is for me the fundamental Marxist theoretical advance: that is 
the refusal to separate individual motivation from historical process. 
Ortner's choice of Bourdieu and Sahlins as pointing the way is a good one for 
this since both these authors are building on the refusal of the dichotomy 
which post sixteenth century ideology has taught so many of us to accept as 
natural. The strength of Sahlins' and Bourdieu's approach is largely due to 
the fact that they do not waste the theoretical dialectic to which I have 
ref erred. 
Secondly Sahlins and Bourdieu are aware that their academic contribution 
is only one among much more general theoretical work which is in no way 
limited to anthropology or universities and that to make a contribution they 
therefore need to build on whatever it is that anthropologists in particular 
have to offer. What they have to offer is above all their intimate knowledge 
of conceptual systems fundamentally different from those from which other 
social sciences have sprung, and a personal intimacy with the people they 
discuss which is an abiding strength of the anthropological tradit5on. This 
need not always be direct but we may be able to use our aroused sympathy for 
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understanding analogous situations. Thus Sahlins comes alive when he thinks 
by means of his imagined representation of the arrival of Cook in Tahiti and 
similarly so does Bourdieu when talking, for example, of the Kabyle sense of 
honour. 
These writers have outlined new styles (not theories) for such things as 
handling socialisation in history, in the case of Bourdieu, and action in 
political history, in the case of Sahlins, which do take advantage of many of 
the theoretical insights which have been built up gradually but they have 
added the effort towards intellectual community between observed and observer 
which can make anthropology transcend its avowed aims. 
But their work has also severe limitations and these limitations come in 
part from the ethnographic information which they use to think their theories 
with. The cases are too simple in the case of Sahlins, and too poorly 
documented in the case of Bourdieu. This is perhaps not an accident; the 
effort at combining theory and personal involvement is so daunting that we try 
all kinds ofsubterfuges to run away from it. 
The eternal return to the primeval scene on the beach in Hawaii is 
extremely thought provoking but also severely limiting because of its 
exceptional character, especially that it is a history with a zero beginning. 
As a result Shalins is able to abolish the distinction between event and 
1 
structure much too easily and as a result to get away with a model of social 
change which by-passes most of the difficulties which the critics of primitive 
Marxism have had to face. 
Bourdieu chooses to focus on the crucial importance of the creation of 
the historical person in historical process. But in fact his account is not 
based on any direct study of these processes. This is not all that surprising 
since the project will be very difficult. But the absence of real cases leads 
to rather similar simplifications to those of Sahlins. 
But as Ortner points out the work of Sahlins and Bourdieu is both 
symptomatic and stimulating of developments in anthropology which, like them, 
build on the past and perhaps will build on it even more securely. 
What Bourdieu's questions require are studies of the formation of 
persons in real socio political Contexts and this requires new combinations of 
anthropology and psychology which are extremely difficult to carry out in 
practice, so it is not surprising that as far as I know these have been few 
and only tentative. In Britain the, as yet unpublished, studies of Boyer and 
Toren go a little way in this direction and the radical questions asked by 
Wilson and Sperber may give us a new impetus. In the U.S.A. you might be able 
to tell me what to hope for. 
However it is much more in the new raprochment between anthropology and 
history that really exciting things seem to be happening. It is not so much 
in the adding of history to anthropology that anything new is happening. This 
is as old as the hills and a lot of history done by anthropologists is 
embarrassingly amateurish. What is encouraging is the new sophistication in 
posing questions about the historical implications of anthropological 
theories, the bringing to bear of much more of the theoretical thought which 
has developed this century to the questions which we have been asking for a 
long time. 
And we have done this in a particularly good anthropological way. First 
,, 
of all we have considered these questions in the light of examples which we 
construct from our knowledge of non-western systems. It is not that I have 
anything against "anthropology at home", it is simply that our theoretica.1 
thinking is still desperately Euro-centred (and this is particularly true of 
~arxism) and that we (all social theorists) need to continually bring what to 
us is the exotic as a critique of our theoretical effort. The anthropological 
tradition is available to do that. Secondly, because of our personal contact 
we have been able to imagine historical action in a particularly immediate and 
theoretically testing way. In this we are joining the long march of theory in 
a way that I find very hopeful. 
Actually, I feel things are going on quite nicely and I do not believe 
in a crisis in social theory of which anthropology would be a part. 
Admittedly a lot of time is being wasted by stupidities which could have been 
avoided by a better understanding of what had already been achieved in the 
field of theory, sometimes quite a long time ago. Some relatively minor but 
yet important debates are given quite disproportionate attention, but then 
this is only for a time and so no permanent harm is done, an example of this 
is the recent discussions on the nature of ethnography. Then there is a lot 
of work labelled "anthropology" which I feel would be better done within other 
academic traditions. But all these distractions are not new. What is new is 
the great amount of first rate work which is also appearing and which seems to 
me of higher quality than most of what had gone before. 
A period of less than five years has produced such works as Pina- 
Cabral ' s work on Portugal ( 1986) , Myers ' work on Australian Aborigines (1 986) , 
 an's work on Zimbabwe (1985), to give only three examples among many, many 
other excellent studies both in the press and published, all of which face the 
significance of action in historical process in the light of the subtle 
theories which we have all been forging over time. This is an exhilarating 
period. These are important, scholarly and sensitive works. They have their 
roots in work done since the sixties and long before. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bloch, M. 1977 "The past and the present in the present" n.s. vol. 12. 
. 1983 flarxism and Anthr0~010qv: The historv of a relationship, 
Oxford University Press. 
. 1985 "From Cognition to Ideology" in R. Fardon, (ed.) Power an4 
Knowledse. Scottish Universities Press. 
Godelier, M. 1971 I' Mythe et Histoire: reflexions sur les fondements de la 
pensee sauvage." pnnales May-August 1971. 
. 1984 L'Ideel et le MaterieL. Fayard: Paris. 
Lan, D. 1985 Guns and Rain. University of California Press. 
Lichtheim, G. 1961 Marxism. A Historical and Critical Studv. Columbia 
University Press. 
Myers, F. 1986 PintuPi Countrv. PintuDi Self. Smithsonian Institution 
Press. 
Pina-Cabral, J. 1986 Sons of Adam. Daushters of Eve. Oxford University 
Press. 
Terray, E. 1985 "Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of 
Gyaman." In M. Bloch ed. Earxist Analvses and Social AnthrODOlOUV. 
Malaby Press, London. 
Jane F. Collier and Sylvia J. Yanagisako 
Department of Anthropology 
Stanford University 
-6. 
"This article is now in press in Critiuue of AnthrODOlOqV. Permission to 
reprint has been requested from the journal. 
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE FEMINIST PRACTICE 
In a footnote to her paper on "Theory in Anthropology since the 
Sixties," Sherry Ortner observes that "feminist anthropology is one of the 
primary contexts in which a practice approach has been developing" (1984:145). 
In this paper, we expand on this footnote to explain why feminist practice has 
led many anthropologists to adopt theoretical positions Ortner identifies with 
a "practice approach" and how practice approaches might benefit from the 
insights of feminist theory. We agree with Ortner that "practice" is neither 
a theory nor a method in itself, but rather a key symbol, "in the name of 
which a variety of theories and methods are being developed (1984:127)." Some 
of these, we think, offer critical concepts and promising analytical agendas; 
others, however, lead back to old impasses. We argue that some of the 
insights that have emerged from feminist practice help us steer clear of what 
might be called "common sense'' readings of practice theory and lead us instead 
toward "good sense" readings of it (~ramsci 1971). 
It is no accident that feminist analysis has been one of the primary 
contexts in which a practice approach has developed in anthropology. 
Likewise, it is not surprising that Sherry Ortner, who has been a major 
contributor to feminist anthropology, should herald this approach as a "new 
trend that seems to be gathering force and coherence'' (1984:144). With the 
revival of the women's movement in the 19601s, feminists searching for ways to 
overturn Western patriarchy looked to anthropologists for explanations of 
sexism, its origins, and for models of liberation. As we were called upon to 
focus on women's lives and the construction of gender systems, we soon found 
ourselves asking questions that could not be answered within available 
theoretical frameworks. Like other social theorists who were tiring of the 
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sterile formalism of structuralism and the static utilitarianism of 
structural-functionalism, feminist scholars were dissatisfied with the failure 
of prevailing theoretical approaches to confront issues of power and 
inequality. Feminist practice demanded the development of new theory and 
concepts, and feminist anthropology provided a nurturing environment for 
nascent ovular, rather than seminal, approaches. 
The features of a practice approach identified by Ortner, speak directly 
to the concerns of feminist scholars seeking ways to understand and undermine 
male dominance. 
(1) Ortner observes that a central element of the practice approach is 
its focus on real people doing real things (1984:144). Feminist practice also 
fosters a focus on actors--or more accurately, actresses--because it requires 
that women be treated as social agents. Heeding the call to focus on women, 
feminist anthropologists soon found that they were largely absent from 
existing ethnographic accounts or, if present, were portrayed as preoccupied 
with childcare and housework. As a result, many took as their first task the 
recovery of women's voices. They searched ethnographies for women's actual 
words and inteviewed women about their activities and their views of social 
life. 
(2) Like practice theorists, many feminist anthropologists combine a 
focus on real people doing real things with "a view that 'the system' does in 
fact have [a] very powerful, even 'determining,' effect upon human action and 
the shape of events" (1984:146). When forced by feminist practice to 
recognize that women, by their actions, often contribute to women's 
oppression--through footbinding, female infanticide, infibulation, malicious 
gossip, or anti-abortion agitation--many feminist anthropologists began to ask 
why women act against what appear to be their own interets. They soon focused 
onf'the system" to understand the social construction of women's desires, 
perceptions, and possibilities (~osaldo 1980a) . 
(3) "The system" for these feminist anthropologists, as for practice 
theorists, is a system of inequality, constraint, and domination--a system 
that restricts women's possibilities and may lead them to collude in their 
oppression, even while it enables them to resist and shape the form of male 
domination. Although many feminist anthropologists search for "egalitarian 
societies," they usually do so to highlight the inequalities of modern 
capitalism. Feminist practice is inherently critical. 
(4) Because feminist practice calls for changes in gender roles, it 
highlights the cultural construction of concepts of femininity and 
masculinity, thus leading many feminist anthropologists to share the 
assumption of practice theorists that the "system of domination" is a cultural 
system--that "society and history...are governed by organizational and 
evaluative schemes...embodied within institutional, symbolic, and material. 
forms" (0rtner 1984:148). Sherry Ortner and Harriet Whitehead have written 
that "gender, sexuality, and reproduction [are] svmbols, invested with meaning 
by the society in question, as all symbols are. The approach to the problem 
of sex and gender is thus a matter of symbolic analysis and interpretation, a 
matter of relating such symbols to other cultural symbols and meanings on the 
one hand, and to forms of social life and social experience on the other" 
(1981 : 1-2). 
(5) Feminist practice also leads us, like practice theorists, to . 
question the utility of breaking the system into paired analytical oppositions 
such as base and superstructure, society and culture, domestic and politico- 
jural domains, production and reproduction--in which one half of the pair is 
viewed as determining the other. Whether or not they view the system as a 
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"relatively seamless whole" (0rtner 1984:148), most feminist anthropologists 
agree that the seams sewn by traditional Marxists, Durkheimians, and 
structural functionalists obscure women's participation in politics and men's 
participation in domestic relations, thus concealing the gendered character of 
all social relations and the pervasiveness of gender inequality. 
(6) Because the feminist political agenda calls for change, feminists 
have always been interested in distinguishing the processes that promote the 
perpetuation of systems of gendered inequality from those that facilitate 
their transformation. Consequently, most feminist anthropologists share the 
concern of practice theorists to understand "how practice reproduces the 
system, and how the system may be changed by practice" (0rtner 1984:154). 
P 
In summary, feminist anthropologists have been active participants in 
the development of a practice approach because feminist practice forces us to 
grapple with the central problem of practice theory: that of trying to 
understand how the system constructs actresses and actors and how these agents 
realize and transform the system. 
COMMON SENSE AND GOOD SENSE READINGS OF PRACTICE THEORY 
In his foreward to the English Edition of Outline of a Theorv of 
practice (Bourdieu 1977), the translator Richard Nice voices his fears about 
the misreading to which the text might be subjected. In addition to the 
possibility that Bourdieu's book might be merged in the reader's mind with the 
very tendencies it combats in the "structuralism" and "structural-Marxism" 
dominant in France in the late seventies, Nice feels "there is still reason to 
fear that the frequent references made to the Anglo-American philosophical 
tradition--a heaven-sent weapon against the theoreticism which so strongly 
characterizes French social science, from Durkheim to Levi-Strauss--may, when 
returned to their original universe, take on a significance very different 
from the one they were given in a context in which that tradition is disdained 
or unknown, and be seen as a sign of allegiance to positivism" (1977:viii). 
While one might question this overly simplified dichotomization of national 
philosophical traditions, we agree with Nice that one of the dangers of the 
attempt to "break out of a scheme of thought as deeply embedded as the 
opposition between subjectivism and objectivism" is that it may be "perceived 
through the categories which it seeks to transcend"  ice 1977:viii). 
In particular, we are concerned that an emphasis on agency, strategy, 
and the interests of individuals in practice approaches can easily lead to an 
implicit opposition between the "practical" and the "symbolic." Such a scheme 
overlooks the fact that people's practical concerns and strategies are as 
culturally constructed as so-called "symbolic" ones and leads us back to old 
impasses generated by Durkheim1s,deeply gendered distinction between the 
sacred and profane. 
Common Sense and Good Sense Readinss of Stratesv 
In his analysis of matrimonial strategies and social reproduction in 
Kabylia, Bourdieu distinguishes official kinship, which the ethnologist often 
treats as representing the social reality of marriage practices, from 
practical kinship, "the field of relationships constantly reused and thus 
reactivated for future use" in which ordinary marriages are contracted 
(1977:52). Bourdieu opposes official kinship to practical kinship "in terms 
of the official as opposed to the non-official. ..., the collective as opposed 
to the individual; the public...as opposed to the private...; and collective 
ritual...as opposed to strategy" (1977:35). The collective matrimonial 
strategy of a lineage is the product of the differing interests of the various 
agents in domestic power relations--not all of whom identify their own 
interests with those of the lineage. In particular, women do not share men's 
commitment to the "symbolic and political interests" of lineage unity. 
Instead, economic calculation, which is repressed in men, "finds more overt 
expression in women, who are structurally predisposed to be less concerned 
with the symbolic profits accruing from political unity, and to devote 
themselves more readily to strictly economic practices" (1977:62). Excluded 
as they are from "representational kinship," women are "thrown back on 
the...practical uses of kinship, investing more economic realism (in the 
narrow sense) than the men in the search for a partner for their sons. or 
daughters" (1977:66). Like the poor (1977:213), women are "less sensitive to 
symbolic profits and freer to pursue material profits" (1977:62). 
A common sense reading of Bourdieu's analysis suggests that women 
operate outside of, and apart from, symbolic systems. The alternative good 
sense reading would be to view women's commitment to the breakng up of joint 
ownership and the division of the patrimony as motivated by opposed, but 
equally symbolic and political, interests shaped by the same system of 
representational kinship. 
A good sense reading may be hard to achieve, however, because the 
distinction between men's strivings to accumulate symbolic capital and women's 
economic calculation so easily becomes a symbolic/practical opposition which, 
in turn, easily becomes Durkheim's gendered sacred/profane opposition in new 
guise. The problem results from the term "symbol," whose use often conjures 
up a misleading opposition with the non-symbolic. The dictionary, for 
example, defines a "symbol" as "something used for or regarded as something 
else" (The Random House Dictionarv of the Enslish ~ansuasej, thus 
establishing, by contrast, non-symbols as things which are not used for, or 
regarded as, representing something other than themselves. If symbols require 
interpretation, non-symbols are by this logic, transparent. They are simply 
what they are. 
The conceptual opposition between symbols and non-symbols leads to two 
related analytic impasses. First, when we define certain actions as symbolic, 
we risk setting ourselves the task of ferreting out the "true meaning" of 
these actions--a task which too often results in reducing symbolic action to 
familiar motivations, such as self-interest or the Oedipus complex. The other 
side of the coin of this reduction is the presumption that actions not 
labelled as symbolic have obvious--i.e. pragmatic, and equally familiar--aims. 
Michelle Rosaldo observed that by "separating the symbolic from the everyday, 
anthropologists quickly come upon such 'universal' facts as correspond to 
their assumptions, and fail to see that common discourse as well as the more 
spectacular feats of poets and religious men requires an interpretive account" 
(1980b:23). So, many anthropologists continue to view the sexual division of 
labor in society as an extension of the "biological facts" that set up 
functional prerequisites rather than as an aspect of symbolically mediated 
system of social identities. 
The concept of "symbolic domination" (~abinow 1975) or "symbolic power" 
(~ourdieu 1977:159) can lead to the same impasses as the concept of "symbolic 
capital." When an anthropologist chooses to call a historical instance of 
domination "symbolic," she or he risks suggesting, by default, the existence 
of other forms of domination that do not require cultural interpretation. 
Just as the term "symbolic capital" can Suggest that those who pursue 
"material well-being" are operating outside of, and apart from, symbolic 
systems, so the term "symbolic domination" can sugget that those unfortunates, 
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who are subjected to economic or physical coercion experience their subjection 
outside of, and apart from, systems of cultural meaning. 
The conceptual impasse generated by dividing the universe of social 
practices into the "practical" and the "symbolic" closely parallels the 
impasse that Asad (1987:605) argues arises out of opposing force (coercion) 
and consensus (misrepresentation) models of domination. Asad faults Marxist 
anthropologists such as Bloch and Godelier for assuming that relations of 
unequal power are essentially dependent either on consensus or on force--or on 
a combination of the two. He argues that "'force' is not a logical 
alternative to 'consensusf--that is to the sharing of concepts that define 
.. common social conditions. Indeed, we can go a step further and say that the 
effectiveness of 'force' as a means of domination is itself dependent on a 
minimal sharing of concepts--as Hobbes long ago pointed out"  sad 1987:605). 
All of these tendencies to differentiate practices into the "symbolic" 
versus the "practical, " the "material, I' the "economic" or the "coercive" 
replicate Durkheim's sacred/profane opposition. It is an irony of history-- 
and a testimony to the continuing power of Durkheim's sacred/profane 
distinction--that practice theory, which deliberately set out to analyze the 
"practices of ordinary living'' rather than the rituals that concerned most of 
Durkheim's followers, should neverthless sometimes lead to the labelling of 
only some actions as symbolic, thus reproducing the sacred/profane opposition. 
Feminist practice, however, can help us to recognize, and so steer clear 
of, the impasses generated by reinventing the sacred/profane dichotomy. 
Because the dichotomy is deeply gendered, feminist practice reveals its 
inherent limitations. It is not merely that Durkheim overlooked women's 
participation in rituals and treated women's tasks as fulfilling biological 
rather than social needs, but that by defining as sacred those practices that 
. ' :,,I 
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represented and reproduced certain kinds of collectivities--such as moieties, 
tribes, and whole nations--Durkheim privileged male domains of action. A 
central dimension of male dominance in most, if.not all societies, is men's 
authority to define their actions and the social relations they organize as 
constructing culturally valued collectivities. Durkheim's concern with 
"official" collective action led him to slight the practices of women and 
children and, consequently, to relegate them by default to the domain of the 
non-symbolic. But feminist practice has taught us that women's actions, as 
well as men's, are formulated and interpreted through symbolic processes. 
Common Sense and Good Sense Readinss of Individual Interest 
Given its focus on the symbolic construction of collectivities, 
Durkheimian analysis in anthropology has been less concerned with displaying 
how it is that individuals in different structural positions come to realize 
the system through their various strategies, much less transform it. In 
attempting to correct this oversight, practice approaches have sometimes 
fallen prey to a crude version of interest theory. We agree with Ortner that 
an "interest theory" reading of practice is fraught with problems, and that it 
conveys the misleading appearance of filling the need for a theory of 
motivation in post-Durkheimian social theory. 
From the moment feminist anthropologists began to empower female 
subjects as social agents capable of acting in and upon social systems as well 
as being constrained by them, we have been vexed by the problem of how to 
conceptualize the interests of individuals. As we began to question 
Durkheimian assumptions about the unity of the desires and interests of 
members of collectivities ranging from domestic. groups to social classes, 
concepts such as "family goals" and "household strategies" became immediately 
suspect. Feminist scholars, of course, have not been the only ones to 
challenge the solidarity of Durkheimian collectivities; so have Marxist 
scholars and practice theorists. Bourdieu summarizes this challenge in 
writing that "from the individual family up to the largest political units, 
the cohesion endlessly exalted by the mythological and genealogical ideology 
lasts no longer than the power relations capable of holding individual 
interests together." 
Having challenged the mythological ideology holding together 
collectivities, many anthropologists shifted their gaze to the strategies 
actors use to pursue their individual interests. The results, however, have 
often been disappointing, particularly when the actors have been actresses. 
Too often, as in Bourdieu's analysis of Kabylian matrimonial strategies and in 
essentialist accounts of women's strategies, the interests of women are 
assumed rather than explained. This has led some of us to wonder whether we 
have traded a mythological concept of collectivity for an equally mythological 
one of individual interest. 
A good deal of the problem with the concept of "individual interest" 
that has risen out of the ruins of Durkheimian collectivities is that a 
concern with strategic agents making their way in a contentious world can 
easily lead to assuming that the "interests" of individuals are focused on 
themselves. Having thrown out a naive notion of altruism, we have too often 
grasped a naive notion of selfish interests, or at least self-oriented ones. 
So, for example, the family is construed as the locus of struggle between 
individuals, each pursuing their egocentric projects. 
Such a view, however, blinds us to the collective nature of a good deal 
of what we Call individual interests. We do not mean by this that people are 




individuals pursue are as often motivated by ideological models of 
collectivities as by ideological models of self-interest. In any particular 
social system, men and women may be structurally predisposed to constructing 
different collectivities. As Bourdieu points out in his analysis of 
matrimonial strategies, whether these are labelled collective or individual 
interests is a matter of cultural hegemony. The strategies women sometimes 
use to destroy the collectivities men pursue and valorize (as, for example, 
patrilineal extended households and lineages) are often motivated by 
ideological representations of alternative collectivities. 
Moreover, the "selfish" desires and interests that motivate individuals, 
whether men or women, are no less mythological, ideological constructs than 
the collective ones. Surely no one knows better than observers of 
contemporary American society that the interests of individuals in 
"maintaining one's independence," "getting into shape," and "finding oneself" 
are as much the ideological constructions of a system of inequality as are the 
"collective goals" of "family unity." However, because they are attributed to 
individuals whom we construe as discrete physiological and motivational 
entities, individual interests have not been as closely subjected to 
interpretation as collective ones, which are by definition social. 
Finally, the interests of individuals change as the possibilities open 
to them change and they find themselves pursuing projects they had not 
previously imagined. As Asad (1987:607) writes, "What makes us see and desire 
new things is the prior reformation of conditions that was only marginally the 
result of intent." To subject the interests of individuals, whether 
complementary or opposed, to a systematic analysis that presumes either social 
reproduction or social transformation is to collapse time--and so to retreat 
into the very atemporalism that practice approaches seek to transcend. A good 
sense reading of practice theory would instead analyze the symbolically- 
mediated processes through Which all interests are constituted by people 
living in specific historical circumstances and shaped by particular 
ideological systems. 
Common Sense and Good Sense Readinas of Reproduction 
One of the important attractions practice approaches hold for feminist 
anthropologists is that they confront a central question of feminist 
scholarship: how systems of inequality, with all their contradictions and 
inherent instability, can be reproduced-. In vkewing cultural systems as" 
simultaneously constraining people and enabling them to resist and shape the 
system, practice approaches substitute a dynamic instability of struggle and 
resistance for a static, Durkheimian equilibrium. 
Yet some strands of practice theory, like some strands of feminist 
anthropology, come dangerously close to eroding this analytical advantage by 
characterizing some spheres of social life as the privileged sites of social 
reproduction. For example, in her article on "Theory in Anthropology since 
the Sixties," Sherry Ortner writes that: "...much of systemic reproduction 
takes place via the routinized activites and intimate interactions of domestic 
life. To the degree that domestic life is insulated from the wider social 
sphere ... important practices--of gender relations and child socialization-- 
remain relatively untouched, and the transmissions of novel meanings, values, 
and categorical relations to succeeding generations may be hindered" 
(1 984: 157) . 
This image of an intimate domestic life of routinized gender relations 
and child socialization, sheltered from the transforming forces of political 
struggle in the "wider social sphere," is commonplace in Marxist anthropology 
and practice theory as well as in structural functionalism. Some Marxist 
scholars, including many Marxist feminists, for example, assert, without 
demonstrating, that working class families produce socialized labor for 
capitalism, thus assuming the socially reproductive nature of domestic 
relations. Likewise, practice theorists such as Bourdieu argue that the taste 
and cultural knowledge professional families inculcate in their children 
enable the latter to reproduce their parent's class status. But because he 
does not document precisely how this inculcation is achieved, nor demonstrate 
convincingly that it is a significant determinant of the reproduction of 
class, rather than part of a mythological model of achievement, this process 
remains as shrouded in shadows as the mystified process of cultural 
transmission through child socialization so central to the work of culture and 
personality cheory. 
Above all, there is a troubling inconsistency in the way all these 
models of domestic life treat relations of domination and inequality outside 
the domestic sphere as opposed to those inside it. While the former are 
viewed as constituting a site of contention and struggle requiring either 
forms of coercion or symbolic domination, or both, the latter are viewed as 
constituting a site for the stable," unproblematic reproduction of routininzed 
activities and relations, free from social conflict. 
This inconsistent characterization of relations of inequality arises 
from a Marxist privileging of relations of production and from assumptions 
" about the biological basis of relations of production. Although Marx saw 
production and reproduction as a unified process, there is a strong tendency 
among some Marxists and Marxist-feminists to follow Engels' distinction 
between production and reproduction. Once this functional division of social 
processes becomes'conflated with a gendered dichotomization of domains, the 
domestic sphere becomes construed as the locus of gendered relations of 
reproduction while the public sphere is construed as the locus of nongendered 
relations of production (~anagisako and Collier 1987). 
Commonsense notions about the universal, biological base of reproductive 
relations then come into play. When Cast as logical extensions of the 
functional requirements of the biology of human reproduction, relations of 
domination and inequality in the domestic sphere take on a natural, stable, 
and uncontentious aura. In other words, by eliding a folk model of biological 
reproduction with an analytical model of social reproduction we end up 
assuming that domestic relations are inherently conservative. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, our argument is that feminist practice has not only provided a 
primary context for the development of practice approaches in anthropology, as 
Ortner observes in her footnote, but it can steer us clear of impasses 
generated by reinventing, in new guises, Durkheim's sacred/profane opposition. 
Like practice theorists, feminist anthropologists are concerned with 
understanding the "practical strategies of everyday life," the motives of 
individuals, and the ways that systems of inequality and domination are 
reproduced as well as transformed. But feminist anthropologists are perhaps 
especially alert to the dangers of assimilating new theoretical interests into 
old conceptual oppositions. Because common sense too easily suggests that 
"practical strategies" can be opposed to "symbolic" ones, "individual" 
interests to "collective" rules, and "reproduction" to "production," 
anthropologists pursuing a practice approach may unwittingly find themselves 
working within Durkheim's opposition between the profane world governed by 
biological needs and the sacred world created by man's capacity for symbolic 
thought. Feminist anthropologists, through the practice of fighting sexual 
inequality, have come to recognize that those who use the word "man" too often 
mean just that. In our continuing struggle against the ideological and 
analytical privileging of male symbolic action,. our interest lies in 
contending that all human practices are created by people living and acting 
within historically situated systems of meaning. 
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ARE SOCIAL WHOLES SEAMLESS? 
In "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties," Sherry Ortner provides an 
account "from the actor's point of view" of what other schools of thought look 
like from a "Geertzo-Weberian" perspective (~rtner's phrase, not mine; 130). 
As she foresaw, I find my favourite school of anthropology, a variant of 
structural Marxism, "oversimplified, if not outright distorted" (127).  She 
justifies her biased account by claiming that she is interested not in 
particular approaches themselves, but "in the relations between various 
theoretical schools." Not surprisingly, however, she is at he'r best when 
relating different approaches to her own approach, and at her worst when 
attempting to relate different approaches to one another. In particular, she 
misses out the most important interactions between French and British 
anthropology over the past three decades, and most of this commentary will be 
taken up with correcting these omissions. I have not been able to resist the 
temptation, however, of giving an equally biased and oversimplified account of 
American cultural anthropology from a European perspective in the latter part 
of the paper. I conclude with a few remarks on what I see as the main 
theoretical tasks of the coming decade. 
CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES AND PRACTICES IN FRENCH STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Ortner's claim that structuralism represents "the denial of the 
relevance of the intentional subject in the social and cultural process, and 
the denial of any significant impact of history or 'event' upon structure" 
(138) is simply wrong, at least as far as Levi-Strauss is concerned. She may 
well be confusing his thought with that of the Oxford structuralists discussed, 
below. 
What structuralism tries to accomplish in the wake of Rousseau, 
Marx, Durkheim, Saussure and Freud is to reveal to consciousness 
an obiect other than itself; and therefore to put it in the same 
position with regard to human phenomena as that of the natural and 
physical sciences, and which, as they have demonstrated, alone 
allows knowledge to develop. Recognition -that consciousness is 
not everything, nor even the most important thing, is not a reason 
for abandoning it. (~evi-Strauss , [ 197 1 1  : 629) 
Marx, Durkheim, Saussure and their followers start not from the human subject 
but from the social structures of production, classification and 
communication which underlie and which make possible all human practice. 
Ortner is clearly- very uncomfortable with any approach to human practices in 
terms of the unconscious structures they might exhibit, whether these be those 
of class interest, social classification or grammar. For instance, she notes, 
with apparent approval, "that there was an early rejection of structural 
linguistics and a strong move to vie" language as communication and 
performance" (144), as if structural linguists would ever have denied this 
could also be done. Philosophical approaches such as speech act theory or 
sociolinguistics are not alternatives to structural and generative grammar, 
they merely use the same data--human speech--for different, and complementary 
theoretical purposes. More generally, Ortner seems to view structural 
accounts as incompatible with "actor-centred" and histor.ica1 accounts. Either 
language is the generation of meaning by creative human subjects, a it is 
governed by unconscious rules. Now, as Chomsky among others has endlessly 
pointed out, the infinite creativity of speech is made possible by an 
unconscious framework of grammatical rules. She appears to deny the existence 
of rules which are both collective and unconscious. If she allows a level of 
psychic reality separate from explicit, conscious meanings it is a privatized 
Freudian unconscious, full of egoistic drives, desires, anxieties and 
emotions. The Durkheimian and Marxist traditions stress, on the contrary, in 
their respective concepts of collective representation and ideology, the fact 
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that individuals are never fully the authors of what they think and do, but 
always operate within a field of unexamined assumptions with a social origin, 
which must often remain unexamined if they are to be able to act at all. The 
interest of social science for those within this tradition is to analyze the 
structure of these unexamined assumptions, in the way that a linguist examines 
the structure of the grammar on which speakers rely. 
In fact, if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are 
closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs 
which express their internal states...Thus social life, in all its 
aspects and in every period of its history, is made possible only 
by a vast symbolism. (~urkheim, 1976 [1915] : 230, 231) 
With his shift of focus from individual consciousness to shared symbolism, 
Durkheim made a decisive break with the old philosophical anthropology of Kant 
and his successors which was obsessed with the meanings and intentions of the 
transcendental subject. He pointed out that all meanings must have a material 
substrate, a signifier, if they are to be publicly accessible, and that the 
relation of the particular substrate to its meaning, its signified, is 
essentially arbitrary and established by social convention. Now, what 
interested Durkheim most about religious symbolism was its practical function, 
which he took to be its crucial role in the maintenance of social cohesion. 
It both evoked and communicated internal states of social solidarity. He was 
less interested in the intrinsic properties of symbolic forms, or what 
Saussure labelled as the subject matter of semiology. Thus one might say that 
beginning with Durkheim, French social science viewed conceptual schemes as 
necessarily both embodied in material symbols and embedded in material and 
social processes. As we shall see, many of the subsequent developments in 
French theory occurred around these two axes: of differences in the mode of 
the embodiment of conceptual schemes and of differences in the.mode of their 
embeddedness. 
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Drawing on both Durkheim and Saussure, Levi-Strauss attempted to develop 
a unified theory of social life as Systems of communication. 
This endeavour is possible on three levels, since the rules of 
kinship and marriage serve to insure the circulation of women 
between groups, just as economic rules serve to insure the 
circulation of goods and services, and linguistics the circulation 
of messages. ( [ 19581 : 83) 
Here and there he notes in passing certain intrinsic differences between these 
systems, although one wishes he had developed these insights further. For 
example, he admits that, "words do not speak, while women do; as producers of 
signs, women can never be reduced to the status of symbols or tokens" (~evi- 
Strauss, [1951] : 61), the point being that while7 ksnship systems- can be 
approached in certain respects as systems of communication, the analogy breaks 
down given the different nature of the material embodiment of linguistic and 
kinship schemes. Kinship schemes may serve to regulate marriage, the 
transmission of productive resources, succession to office, recruitment to 
political groups, the circulation of material goods and services and many 
other material processes requiring the mobilization of concrete 
psychobiological individuals. The meanings and roles assigned to these 
individuals may be regarded as largely or even wholly determined by each 
culture, but the political and economic processes just enumerated require 
"warm bodies" which cannot be produced out of thin air the way phonemes can be 
produced. 
Systems of marriage and systems of speech have different relations to 
material reality. Each governs the circulation of objects under a cultural 
form, but for different ends and under different material constraints. Even 
when he turned to systems of classification, he recognized differences in 
their relation to material reality: 
Unlike Other systems of classification, which are primarily 
conceived (like myths) or acted (like rites), totemism is always 
lived, that is to say, it attaches to concrete groups and concrete 
individuals because it is an hereditarv svstem of classification. . . In totemism, therefore, function inevitably triumphs over 
structure. ( [ 19621 : 232) 
Now, if Levi-Strauss moved from the investigation of unconscious 
systems of reciprocity which regulated social processes, such as cross cousin 
marriage, to classificatory schemes which are lived and so still subject to 
demographic chance, such as totemism, to purely conceptual systems such as 
myth, it is because he is ultimately interested precisely in the operations of 
the human mind in general, and not in particular cultural patterns. 
Mythology has no obvious practical function: unlike the phenomena 
previously studied, it is not directly linked with a different 
kind of reality, which is endowed with a higher degree of 
objectivity than its own. (~evi-~trauss, 1964: 10) 
Thus the universal axioms and postulates of "objectified thought" uncovered by 
structural analysis refer to general properties of the human mind, while 
particular mythical systems are explained as the modification of cultural 
traditions in response to changes in the infrastructure: 
Each version of a myth, then, shows the influence of a two fold 
determinism: one strand links it to a succession of previous 
versions or to a set of foreign versions, while the other operates 
transversally, through the constraints arising from the 
infrastructure which necessitate the modification of some 
particular element, with the result that the sgstem.undergoes. 
reorganization in order to adapt these differences to necessities 
of an external kind. (~evi-Strauss, [ 197 11 : 629) 
Even in the realm of mythology, Levi-Strauss never imposes a rigid 
separation between "superstructural" and "infrastructural" phenomena, but 
argues for their continual interaction. Further, it is a basic postulate of 
Levi-Strauss's structuralism that structure is discoverable only through the 
study of transformations as they occur between neighbouring societies or 
through time. 
Despite Levi-Strauss's refusal to separate conceptual schemes from the 
material signs in which they are embodied or from the material functions and 
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purposes they serve, his choice of functions (circulating, thinking, 
communicating, acting, conceiving, classifying) is strikingly one-sided. What 
he neglects are cultural knowledges and practices that have as their object 
the appropriation and transformation of the material world, in other words, 
the "labour" of production and reproduction. These are vaguely allocated to 
an "infrastructure" always treated as itself unproblematic. In fact he 
vacillates between viewing this infrastructure as purely material and inert in 
character, the objective constraints of the natural environment, demography, 
and so on, and as also being part of Culture, as including tools, 
technologies, or even asL "lived-in experience" (1 97 I-: 629)'. Given. his. 
explicit preoccupation with anthropology as a form of general psychology, a 
search for universal properties of the mind through ethnographic comparison, 
this neglect is understandable, and perhaps even legitimate. This 
preoccupation has been followed up by Sperber, who has also done a brilliant 
job of disentangling Levi-Strauss's real discoveries in the realm of symbolism 
from some of his more misleading statements (~perber, 1975). 
For those concerned with anthropology as comparative sociology, however, 
this concern with general psychic mechanisms is clearly inadequate. What the 
former require is precisely a theory of the relation of cultural form to 
material effect. Another way of stating this is in terms of "structures" and 
"functions", so long as the material functions are understood as historically 
variable effects of conceptual structures, and so long as its is recognized 
that both have their own inner logic and historicity. 
One intellectual tradition that has always stressed human transformation 
of nature rather than its contemplation is, of course, that deriving from 
Marx, and it was from Marxism that French anthropologists gained a renewed. 
i n t e r e s t  i n  material product ion  and reproduct ion .  Now Marx i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  
t h a t  l abour  i s  always guided by a conceptua l  scheme. 
We presuppose labour  i n  a form t h a t  stamps it as exc lus ive ly  
human. A s p i d e r  conducts  o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  resemble t h o s e  of  a 
weaver, and a bee p u t s  t o  shame many a n  a r c h i t e c t  i n  t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of he r  cells.  But what d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  worst  
architect from t h e  best of bees  i s  t h i s ,  t h a t  t h e  architect raises 
h i s  s t r u c t u r e  i n  imaginat ion be fo re  he  erects it i n  r e a l i t y .  
( ~ a r x ,  [ 18671 : 174) 
There i s  t h u s  no reason t o  oppose p roduc t ive  l abour  t o  symbolic communication 
as "material" t o  "mental": both involve  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  conceptua l  schemes 
t o  material subs t ances ,  t h e  one t r ans fo rming  them, t h e  o t h e r  no t .  A s  Levi- 
S t r a u s s  pu t  i t  i n  a famous8passage.  
Marxism, i f  no t  Marx h imse l f ,  has t o o  commonly reasoned as though 
practices followed d i r e c t l y  from p r a x i s .  Without ques t i on ing  t h e  
undoubted primacy of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s ,  I b e l i e v e  there i s  always a 
mediator  between p r a x i s  and p r a c t i c e s ,  namely t h e  conceptua l  
scheme by t h e  ope ra t i on  of wh ich  matter and form, n e i t h e r  w i t h  any 
independent  e x i s t e n c e ,  are r e a l i z e d  as s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h a t  i s  as 
e n t i t i e s  which are both empi r i ca l  and i n t e l l i g i b l e .  ( ~ e v i -  
S t r a u s s ,  [1962] : 130) 
Beginning wi th  A l thus se r ,  French Marx.ists a t tempted t o  s h i f t  t h e  
dominant metaphor w i th in  s t r u c t u r a l i s m  from " c i r c u l a t i o n "  t o  "production",  
from "thought" t o  "prac t ice" .  
We can a s s e r t  t h e  primacv of practice t h e o r e t i c a l l y  by showing 
t h a t  a l l  t h e  l e v e l s  of  s o c i a l  e x i s t e n c e  a r e  t h e  s i t e  of d i s t i n c t  
practices: economic p r a c t i c e ,  p o l i t i c a l  practice, i d e o l o g i c a l  
practice, t e c h n i c a l  p r a c t i c e  and s c i e n t i f i c  (or t h e o r e t i c a l )  
p r a c t i c e .  . .We t h i n k  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h i n g  and a r t i c u l a t i n g  
these d i f f e r e n t  p r a c t i c e s  one w i th  a n o t h e r  by th ink ing  t h e i r  
desree of independence and t h e i r  t y p e  of ' r e l a t i v e '  gmtonornv, 
which  are themselves f i x e d  by the i r  t y p e  of dependence w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c e  which  i s  "determinant  i n  t h e  last 
ins tance" :  economic p r a c t i c e .  ..We regard an  element of 
"knowledge", even i n  i t s  most rudimentary forms and even though it 
i s  profoundly s teeped  i n  ideology,  as always a l r eady  p r e s e n t  i n  
t h e  earliest s t a g e s  of p r a c t i c e ,  t h o s e  t h a t  can be observed i n  t h e  
s u b s i s t e n c e  p r a c t i c e s  of  t h e  most "p r imi t i ve"  s o c i e t i e s .  
( ~ l t h u s s e r  , [ 19681 : 58) 
Al thusse r  here a t t empt s  t o  overcome t h e  s te r i le  oppos i t ion  between "theory" 
and " p r a c t i c e "  by showing t h a t  every p r a c t i c e  imp l i e s  some form of knowledge, 
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and all theorizing is a form of practice. What differs from one practice to 
another are the objects, means and relations of production involved in 
carrying them out. But he and his followers (such as ~alibar) remained wedded 
to a mechanical notion of determination by the economy, a tendency to reduce 
the economy to the techno-environmental conditions of production, and an 
ahistorical view of modes of production. These were all parts of a general 
"theoreticism" which they later repudiated, and which derived in no small part 
from their position as philosophy professors at the Ecole Normale Superieure 
(seat also, be it noted, of the contemporary guru ~errida). 
Other students of Althusser, such as the historian Foucault, or the 
anthropologist Terray, were more involved in empirical research. The latter, 
together with other Marxists such as Rey, Meillassoux and Coquery had first 
hand experience with non-capitalist societies during their fieldwork in West 
Africa. As with many British anthropologists they worked in functioning 
colonial or post-colonial societies and were concerned from the beginning with 
issues of power and wealth. They were among the first in the mid-sixties to 
introduce historical material in a theoretically rigorous manner and to 
discuss the "functional articulation'' of modes of production in a manner far 
more sophisticated than the latter "world systems theorists". Even a cursory 
reading of their work on the "lineage mode of production" in Africa and the 
effects of the slave trade makes nonsense of Ortner's statement that 
"structural Marxism was largely nonhistorical" (141: see, for example, Terray, 
1974, 1975, Coquery, 1975; Meillassoux, 1971). At the same time, they were 
actually quite close in some of their concerns and their theoretical concepts 
to the Cambridge anthropologists, which is hardly surprising given the fact 
that Fortes and Goody both worked in West Africa as well. A point overlooked 
in Ortner's paper is that French structural Marxists took at least as much 
from British "structural functionalists" in order to upset the structuralist 
apple cart as the younger generation of British took from the French, just as 
Mauss had had drawn on Malinowski to revise Durkheim. The rhetoric should not 
blind us to the fact that "Althusserian" students of Balandier often had more 
in common with Goody than with Levi-Strauss. 1 
The writings of Bourdieu must be read in terms of this tradition. Far 
from representing an ally of the subjective humanists, he merely insists that 
Levi-Strauss's cognitive interests distort the ethnographic analysis of 
certain types of practice, in particular, the practices of reciprocity in gift 
exchange and marriage, and the perpetuation of political and economic 
subordination in non-capitalist societies. All of these involve consideration 
of the temporal dimension of practice which is likely to be ignored in the 
reversible diagrammatic world of structuralism. He is not advocating a return 
to what he calls the "naive humanism" that criticizes "scientific 
objectification in the name of 'lived experience' and the rights of 
'subjectivity'"(4). His continuing proximity to the Althusserian tradition 
can be gauged, despite his call for a break with Marxist theory, in the 
following quotation from a recent paper: 
In reality, the social space [social formation] is a multi- 
dimensional space, an open set of fields [practices] that are 
relatively autonomous, i.e., more or less strongly and directly 
subordinated [in the last instance?], in their functioning and 
their transformations, to the field of economic production. 
(~ourdieu, 1985: 736) 
One of the obvious dangers of structural Marxism was that it was liable 
to collapse back into the same sort of circular arguments which characterized 
classical structural functionalism. The only real difference then would be 
the stress on material reproduction rather than on social cohesion or on basic 
needs as the telos of the system. Everything depends on whether the material 
effects of cultural forms such as kinship or religion are interpreted as if 
they were designed to perpetuate the relations of production. As Bloch has 
argued, the only way to escape from this is to look at how specific cultural 
forms have actually functioned in history, whether they have actually been 
used to advance (culturally defined) individual or group interests, whether 
they have undergone internal transformations, whether they have always had the 
same political and economic effects. 
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN BRITISH SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
In mainstream British social anthropology, paramount interest has always been 
in those conceptual schemes which have a prominent role in regulating central 
material functions, essentially in kinship as a means of organising the 
economy and polity in stateless societies. As I Shall discuss further below 
when comparing them with American cultural anthropologists, there was a 
reluctance among those working in still partially autonomous colonial 
societies to recognize a level of cultural reality separate from the 
continuing concerns of social and econoniic life. So long as religious ritual 
appeared to play little role in this life, it tended to be left on the 
sidelines, or included only to the extent that it could be shown as a means of 
attaching indivduals to socially valuable sentiments, of moving them from one 
social status to another, or only insofar as an economic (e.g. surplus 
generation) or political (e.g. legitmation of ruler) function could be found 
for it. The major exception to this was the Oxford version of structuralism 
developed by Evans-Pritchard and his followers in the fifties and sixties. I 
shall have more to say on this below. 
Certain teleological aspects of the mainstream tradition, i.e. its 
tendency to reduce practices to the role they played in reproducing the social 
whole, were already being criticized by Leach and Barth in the fifties. 
Unfortunately, these criticisms were articulated in the name of the maximizing 
human subject of formal economics and led many writers off into the dead end 
of transactionalism.' One of the key problems raised by the criticisms of 
both Oxford and Cambridge structuralism was precisely the extent to which the 
systems of ideas and the social functions in any society were both fully 
integrated and all of one piece, i.e. the extent to which society was 
"seamless". Different writers qualified the coherence of the system in 
different ways, Firth introducing a distinction between social structure and 
social organization, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes and others arguing that some 
institutions were more vulnerable to outside disruption than others, and so 
on. As Bloch pointed out in his Malinowski lecture, the assumption, made by 
authors like Geertz or Needham, that people operated with a single, integrated 
conceptual system ruled out the possiblity of their criticizing or changing 
the system in which they lived (1977). He raised the question of whether all 
conceptual schemes are acquired, respond to historical events, and accomplish 
their tasks in the same way. In a series of papers and in his latest book, he 
proposes a very general distinction between the acquistion of conceptual 
schemes in ritual and in everyday contexts, noting the highly restrictive 
conditions placed on communicative codes and the often deliberate assault on 
everyday knowledge in rituals (1974, 1985, 1986) . He has recently shown how 
one particular cultural form, the circumcision ritual of the Merina, has taken 
on a whole series of different functions in the past two hundred years. 
From the formal point of view, the ritual seems to have altered 
surprisingly little in its symbolic aspects: the ritual acts, the 
songs, the objects used. On the other hand, if we take a 
functionalist theoretical perspective, which stresses 
transformations in the the ritual's role in the organization of 
the social and economic system, the ritual seems to have changed 
fundamentally - passing, for example, from a descent-group ritual- 
to a royal ritual and back again.  loch, 1986:157). 
The questions raised by Bloch were part of a more widespread interest in 
the acquisition of conceptual structures, inspired in part by the work of 
developmental psychologists like Piaget and those putting Chomsky's theories 
of innate linguistic structures to the test. Barth, for example, devoted his 
New Guinea ethnography to the examination of how ritual knowledge is actually 
.transmitted in the course of rituals. 
I have argued that such a corpus [as Baktaman knowledge] will only 
persist to the extent that its parts are frequently re-created as 
messages and thereby transmitted. The immediate determinant of 
such messages may be described as social praxis. The mutual 
feedback between thought and action, culture and society, may thus 
best be approached through social organization. (~arth, 1975: 
255, see. also Sperber, 1985) 
In Britain in the seventies, the structural Marxism made possible by the 
work of Levi-Strauss and Althusser seemed to offer a means of breaking out of 
the circularity of some structural functionalist reasoning, of giving a fuller 
account of the structure and function of indigenous conceptual schemes, 
without reducing the one to the other, and of escaping the sort of antiquarian 
Orientalism implicit in the cultural relativism of the Oxford structuralists 
and Chicago symbolists. Following Bloch's lead, we have been investigating 
the changing material functions of conceptual schemes over time. David Lan, 
for example, has shown how the ideology of spirit mediumship played a crucial 
role in mobilizing Support for the nationalist guerillas during Zimbabwe's 
second war of independence, while I have shown how certain concepts of group 
solidarity generated in Buid spirit seances have enabled them to organize in 
defence of their land and autonomy  an, 1985; Gibson, 1986; see also the 
earlier work by ~ry)) . 
The point I have been trying to make in regard to the dialogue between 
British and French anthropology over the last three decades, is that there has. 
been a progressive movement away from a view of society as a seamless whole. 
This movement may be found both within the writings of individual 
anthropologists and within the discipline as a whole. At the level of 
"meaning", or conceptual schemes, such unity as the cosmology of a society 
possesses is always a second or third order attempt to construct an overall 
system out of conceptual schmes with divergent material embodiments and 
purposes, and it is always retrospective in nature, a mythological 
reinterpretation of the historical and "infrastructural" events which 
continually destabilize the cultural structures on which they impinge. At the 
level of "functions", or material effects, the degree to which practices 
actually contribute to the "reproduction" of key social relations, 
particularly those of power and hierarchy, has come to be viewed as an open 
question which can only be answered through historical research. 
Quite at variance with these developments at Cambridge and the London 
School of Economics was the more "idealist" approach prevalent at Oxford. As 
early as 1950, Evans-Pritchard wrote: 
The thesis I have put before you, that social anthropology is a 
kind of historiography, and therefore. ultimately of phLlosophy or. 
art, implies that it studies societies as moral systems and not as 
natural systems, that it is interested in design rather than in 
process, and that it therefore seeks patterns and not scientific 
laws, and interprets rather than explains. (Evans-Pritchard, 1962 
[1950] : 26) 
There is an older tradition than that of the Enlightenment with a 
different approach to the study of human societies, in which they 
are seen as systems only because social life must have a pattern 
of some kind, inasmuch as man, being a reasonable creature, has to 
live in a world in which his relations with those around him are 
ordered and intelligible. (ibid.: 28) 
While Ortner clearly cannot cover everything in her paper, her omission of the 
autonomous development of the Oxford school of "structuralism" is crucial 
because it allows her to confuse their concern with intelligible patterns with 
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Levi-Strauss ' s concern with structural transformations. The distinction 
between the two structuralisms is all the more necessary since a Frenchman, 
Dumont, is actually closer to Oxford than to French structuralism (cf. Dumont, 
1968: 329). While structure for the latter is only discoverable through a 
comparison of several transformations, and is better-described as a process of 
the second order structuring of primary knowledge, for the former structure is 
a fixed pattern of values and beliefs inherent to a culture and stable for 
centuries if not millenia. Thus Dumont on "Hindu hierarchy", and Needham and 
his students Barnes and Forth on dual classification and circulating connubium 
in Eastern Indonesia, assume "a. general concordance throughout all phases- of 
[the] conceptual order" (~arnes, 1974: 305) in the collective representations 
of Hindus and Indonesians, based on the abstract concepts of hierarchy and 
dualism, respectively. It is this sort of British structuralism which 
provides an analogue for American symbolic anthropology, as Ortner notes 
(137), but it must be recognized that it had more to do with Evans-Pritchard 
than with Levi-Strauss. It produced the same kind of "hypercoherent" account 
of cultures that Geertz came to criticize among his own followers (Ortner, 
144) 
Sociology is a science which attempts the interpretive 
understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal 
explanation of its course and effects. In "action" is included 
all human behaviour when and in so far as the individual attaches 
a subjective meaning to it. (~eber [ 19221 : 88) 
In this section I want to argue that Ortner's use of the term "practice 
theory" is misleading because it has less to do with the concept of practice 
as it is used by structural Marxists, and more to do with Weberian "action 
theory", which she has inherited via Parsons and Geertz. It is greatly to be 
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doubted that "most modern practice theorists including those who write in 
Marxist and/or structuralist terms, hold an essentially Geertzian view" of the 
way "culture" shapes "behaviour" (152) . There is an enormous difference 
between practice as understood by structural Marxists and "action" as 
understood by hermeneutic Weberians. 
A number of initially puzzling emphases in Ortner's paper make sense 
only when viewed in this light. Some examples are her astonishing inclusion 
of sociobiology as part of the "general trend" toward an emphasis on 
"intentional choice on the part of actors to maximize" (146); her view that 
"the system" constrains "practice" through "essentially cultural and 
psychological mechanisms" rather than through "constraints of material and 
political sorts" (153); and, in general, her insistence on the centrality of 
psychological anthropology to "practice theory" (151). She favours the 
injection of more emotion and passivity into what she views as the overly 
rational and energetic picture of human motivation drawn by "interest theory" 
(151-2). 
But there is a reason why "action theorists" tend to derive their 
"motivation theory" from "interest theory" (151). It is that the maximization 
of a single value such as power or wealth constitutes intentional action in 
its purest form. Since the "sciences of social action" are distinguished from 
the natural sciences by their ability to use teleological explanation, their 
role in explaining human action increases to the extent that human action 
becomes oriented toward explicit goals and adapted toward achieving those 
goals with the greatest effiency. The coherent world-views of the great 
religious innovators represent the best examples of action oriented to a 
coherent set of ultimate ends, while the profit-maximizing behaviour of the 
capitalist business man represents the best example of efficient achievement 
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of an explicit end. Weber's concern for rational, goal directed behaviour 
follows logically from his definition of the sciences of social action, and 
from his neo-Kantian division of the world into two types of objects and 
events: those governed by objective causality and those governed by 
subjective causality. 5 
In the limited time available I can do no better than to quote from the 
cogent critique of Weber made by Hirst: 
Weber never defines the content of the term "subjective meaning". 
Subjective meaning is pre-social or not necessarily social; it 
precedes the definition of social action in the logic of the 
discourse and helps to establish it. Meaning in this sense cannot 
be the product of language or other. significatory system, for it 
would then be already social or other-regarding . . . Weber's 
subjective meaning must therefore be significance or value for a 
pure consciousness. It is pre-social and pre-linguistic, a 
property of consciousness. Weber's subject is the pure subject of 
classical philosophy - a pure pre-social consciousness. (Hirst, 
1976: 69-70) 
However much Weber's American followers, such as Geertz and Schneider, 
have attempted to "socialize" symbolic meaning, they too remain fundamentally 
oriented toward the interpretation of the subjective meanings which 
individuals attach to particular symbols, and which come to be widely shared 
through "socialization". Socialization is viewed as a process of imbuing 
individual subjects with the ideas and values appropriate to the "cultural" 
and "social" systems. The unit remains the individual subject, rather than 
the differential reproduction of social practices or transmission of 
conceptual schemes in specific types of social situation. 
Parsons and his followers did not just appropriate Weber's "science of 
social action", they combined it with a concept of culture developed in 
America. The point has often been made, but it bears repeating in this 
context, that the division of labour between anthropology and sociology worked 
out by Kroeber and Parsons, as that between the study of "culture" and of 
"society", seemed plausible because of the peculiar view of culture.developed 
by those who had worked either in museums or with Native North Americans whose 
societies had often been severely disrupted by demographic decline, forced 
migration, and the thoroughgoing imposition of alien political and economic 
forms. What was preserved for analysis tended to be just those aspects of 
"culture" most easily reduced to "texts", such as language, ritual, myth and 
art. The whole notion that "cultures" are "texts" demanding humanistic 
interpretation descends from this kind of field research, and is quite foreign 
to the European anthropological tradition which dealt with colonized societies 
whose conceptual schemes were still functioning, to greater or lesser degrees, 
to organize economic and political practices. It is only in this context 
that an "emphasis on the practices of ordinary living" can be viewed as part 
of "the newer practice approaches" (154). A particularly striking example of 
the fetishization of formalized cultural performances appears in Geertz's 1980 
book on "The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali", where he states: 
The state drew its force, which was real enough, from its 
imaginative energies, its semiotic capacity to make inequality 
enchant. ( 1980 : 123) 
This sort of approach, which combines the need to "interpret" subjective 
meanings with a view of "cultures as texts to be read", naturally leads to a 
view of anthropology as one of the humanities, to be pursued with humanistic 
methods for humanistic ends. It is hardly surprising that American 
anthropology, along with American literary criticism, has thus provided 
fertile ground for the spread of the least practice-oriented, most apolitical 
forms of French "post-structuralism". Indeed, these forms are more popular 
here than in their homeland. 
Now, it is true that Ortner appears to endorse the fact that in 
"practice theory" "the system is not broken up into units like base and 
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superstructure, or society and culture, but is rather a relatively seamless 
whole", and "the analytic effort is...to explain the system as an integral 
whole...by referring it to practice" (148). But as we have seen, this 
practice is actually the intentional action of a subject, whose motivations 
are inculcated through socialization, and so on. The seamlessness of the 
system is due to what Althusser calls "expressive causality". 
As Ortner notes, American anthropology has long been riven by a split 
between those in the Parsonian tradition and those who totally reject its 
definition of sociology in favour of a "natural science of society'' approach. 
Among these latter are- cultural ecologists such as- Lee and Rappaport and 
"cultural materialists" such as Harris. They begin by defining culture as the 
specifically human means of adaptation to the environment, and go on to 
analyze human "behaviour", which they admit to be governed by cultural as well 
as genetic codes, as an ethologist analyzes animal behaviour, i.e. in 
relation to how it contributes to subsistence and reproduction. They claim 
further to have given a causal explanation for behaviour by showing that it 
has beneficial material consequences, while at the same time denying the 
causal relevance of intended  effect^.^ The circularity of this sort of 
cultural functionalism, the illegitmacy of its appropriation of concepts such 
as adaptation and behaviour from biology has been pointed out again and again. 
In the extreme form of socio-biology, this approach becomes a caricature of 
scientific argument. Hence the general distaste of the "action theorists" for 
what they view as the scientistic objectivism of the behaviourists, although 
it is also possible for an outsider to sympathize with the distaste of the 
behaviourists for the sometimes frivolous humanism of the more extreme 
activists. Both camps share, however, a view of "the system" as an integrat.ed 
whole generated by a single underlying principle, whether it is defined as an 
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objective cybernetic system of energy flows, or as a subjective system of 
symbols and meanings. 
The opposition between those who stress the material effects of 
behaviour and those who Stress the meaning of symbols derives in part from the 
dissociation of conceptual schemes from material practices which goes back to 
the origins of American cultural anthropology. In my view, some of the 
greatest contributions to theory have come from that current of American 
anthropology which ignored both these extremes, and combined the study of a 
culture's relation to its natural environment with the study of cognitive 
schemes, i.e. the "ethnoscience" school which is completely ignored by 
Ortner. Conklin, for example, has concentrated on the practical knowledge 
people have concerning the world about them, knowledge which they need to be 
competent swidden farmers or wet rice cultivators (1956, 1980). Others, such 
as Berlin and Kay, have searched for cognitive universals. The work of these 
and other "ethnoscientists" may be open to criticism in terms of the 
particular psychological theories one or another has adopted, but their 
demonstration of the fantastic amount of empirical knowledge present in non- 
literate societies, and the limits they demonstrated for the cultural 
relativity of conceptual schemes, were crucial for the development of French 
structuralism. As I have argued, the "infrastructure" as understood by Lbvi- 
Strauss, Sperber and Bloch really consists in just this kind of "encyclopedic" 
knowledge of the world, while the "superstructure" of myth and ritual 
symbolism constitutes a second order elaboration based upon, but irreducible 
to, this primary knowledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
In my opinion, the theoretical tasks for the future require, first, that we 
take as our unit of analysis not the individual and his or her conscious or 
preconcious tactics, strategies or motivations, but the conceptual scheme as 
both materially embodied and embedded, as transmitted in specific types of 
social situation to specific categories of person, and as developing unevenly 
with other conceptual schemes through time due to differences in the nature of 
their respective embodiments, functions, situations and personal carriers. 8 
Second, we must approach the renewed interest in the "construction of 
self, person, emotion and motive" with caution, and not confuse it with 
psychological anthropology (151). Accounts of ethnopsychology should be 
treated in the same way as accounts of ethnozoology or ethnobotany: the 
subject matter of the latter is no more that of biological anthropology than 
that of the former is the subject matter of psychological anthropology. Thus 
while I would argue that individual human motivations cannot be used to 
explain social phenomena, I would agree that variations in sociallv recosnize4 
tvpes of motivation, both within and between societies, are a legitimate, even 
central, object of investigation. Further, variations in the degree to which 
self-aggrandizing individual strategies and initiatives are recognized as 
legitimate may often provide us with a sketch of the power structure within a 
society. Thus the structurally defined degree of legitimate maneuverability 
will vary not only by social situation but also according to the social class, 
gender, and ethnicity of the individuals involved. The sort of stratified 
society with a weak or non-existent state and minimal constant capital 
described by Bourdieu among the Kabyle, and which is also characteristic of 
much of island Southeast Asia, for example, demands a great deal of deliberate 
manipulation and strategizing by would-be big men. As Bourdieu argues, this 
is because: 
Once a system of mechanisms has been constituted capable of 
objectively ensuring the reproduction of the established order.by 
its own motion, the dominant class have only to let the svstem 
thev dominate take its own course in order to exercise their 
domination; but until such a system exists, they have to work 
directly, daily, personally, to produce and reproduce conditions 
of domination which.are even then never entirely trustworthy. 
(~ourdieu , 1977 [ 19721 : 190) . 
Thus in capitalism, the concentration of the means of production in the hands 
of the capitalist is reproduced without the capitalist having to personally 
defend his property, while among the Kabyle or the Swat Pathan (~arth, 1959) 
every big man must continually struggle to maintain his political position. 
The capitalist must, on the other hand, continually struggle to expand his 
market and reduce his costs of production if he is not to lose his economic 
position. Societies like the those of the !Kung or Buid, on the other hand, 
may attach a strongly negative value to overt displays of competitiveness or 
self-advancement by any person in any situation, except, perhaps, the 
romantic. In'other societies like the Nuer or the Iban all adult men may be 
expected to compete militarily. And so on. Every society, in short, assigns 
a different place to individual strategizing. 
Third, we must develop more sophisticated accounts of the behaviour of 
conceptual schemes in history. This will demand ever closer cooperation 
between theoretically minded social historians and social anthropologists. 
Such cooperation has been developing rapidly in Southeast Asian studies, as 
hybrid works by authors such as Tambiah (I 976) , Ileto (1979) , warren (198 1) 
and Bloch (1986) show. Some of the issues raised by these authors are: the 
way traditional rituals are transformed into ideologies legitimating the 
growth of states and empires; the way societies retaining a relative autonomy 
in their conceptual schemes, particularly those governing political and 
54 
religious situations, participate in regional or world economic systems 
integrated only at the level of commodity exchange and military domination;' 
the use of traditional religious symbolism to mount challenges to the 
political order; and the genesis of indigenously based multi-ethnic empires on 
the fringes of and in response to the world economic system. 
Fourth, in addition to the historical approach just mentioned, many of 
these same issues may be profitably approached from a regional, inter-societal 
perspective, since it is precisely where groups of people who share relatively 
few conceptual schemes are interacting on the levels of politico-military 
depredation and commodity exchange that the functional articulation of 
autonomous conceptual schemes can best be observed. A propos of the second 
point above, the relative success of certain societies in a region may rest in 
part on the degree to which individual status within one society is achievable 
by means such as success in war or long distance trade, providing a socially 
constituted motivation for foreign trade and conquest. ' 
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1 Godelier was closer to Levi-Strauss than to Althusser, and through a 
syncretic tour de force he attempted to integrate the traditional concerns of 
British structural functionalism, a cybernetic view of structure, and Marxism 
with Levi-Strauss's insights into the structure of systems of classification: 
[~t] is not enough for an institution such as kinship to assume 
several functions for it to be dominant within a society and to 
integrate all levels of social organisation, all the parts of 
society, as the functionalists would say. Over and above this, 
kinship must also function as the system of the relations of 
production regulating the rights of groups and of individuals in 
respect to the means of production and their access to the 
products of their labour. . . Levi-Strauss's structural analysis 
explains the logic of forms but ignores the logic of functions. 
(~odelier, 1975: 14, 15) 
His student, Friedman, coming from a background in American cultural ecology, 
put it another way: 
It is absolutely necessary not to confuse the levels of 
functioning of a social formation with the cultural institutions 
that take on those functions. What appears as "religion" in terms 
of a number of inherent cultural characteristics might function as 
a superstructure in one society and as relations of production in 
another. . . Money capital has the same internal properties 
whether it is restricted to children's games or dominates the 
process of production. (~riedman, 1975: 163) 
2 Transactionalism may in fact be regarded as a British .analogue of socio- 
biology, albeit a far more sophisticated one, in that both of them edit 
culturally relative conceptual schemes out of their analysis, and replace them 
with the strategies of a culture-free maximizing agent. 
3 Ortner, incidentally, is quite mistaken in her representation of the Marxist 
concept of ideology as a "narrowing of the culture concept" (140), or in her 
assumption that "culture (=I ideology') " for Bloch (1 53) . If one had to 
attempt a translation into Ortner's theoretical language, one would have to 
say that ideological schemes are a subset of cultural schemes, and have 
certain properties, such as being transmitted in certain formalised social 
situations, contradicting common sense knowledge, and stability through time 
(see also the quotation from Althusser on different types of practices above). 
Culture also includes non-ideological schemes, which may or may not be 
compatible with current scientific theory, but which are acquired in a 
different type of situation and which are formally more flexible or "creative" 
in response to new situations. These would include the sort of schemes 
investigated by the ethnoscientists, for example. 
4 This omission is all the more surprising considering the importance she 
attaches in her monograph on Sherpa ritual to Pivinitv and Experience by 
Godfrey Lienhardt, a product of this tradition. It must be said that the best 
work in Britain on religion was produced at Oxford until French structuralism 
made a real impact in the late sixties. 
5 Weber was the first to admit that not all human action is subject to cold, 
rational calculation, but that much of it is "emotional": 
The more readily we ourselves are susceptible to them the more 
readily can we imaginatively participate in such emotional 
reactions as anxiety, anger, ambition, envy . . . Even when such. 
emotions are found in a degree of intensity of which the observer 
himself is completely incapable, he can still have a significant 
degree of emotional understanding of their meaning and can 
interpret intellectually their influence on the course of action 
and the selection of means. (weber [1975] : 92) 
It is always much more satisfactory, however, to build ideal constructs of 
rational actions, where it is much easier to achieve "adequacy on the level of 
meaning". 
We apply the term "adequacy on the level of meaning" to the 
subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and 
in so far as, according to our habitual modes of thought and 
feeling, its component parts taken in their mutual relation are 
recognized to constitute a "typical" complex of meaning. (weber-, 
1975: 99) 
Internal coherence and adequate subjective grounds for action are much clearer 
in rational than in irrational action, and it is the search for these that 
define sociology. Ortner's plea for the consideration of more complex 
"motivations" such as "need, fear, suffering, desire, and others" (151) was 
anticipated by Weber, but has met with little effectual response since his 
day, for the reasons I have given. 
6 Animal behaviour can be "explained" in terms of its material consequences 
because one can safely assume that genetically determined behaviour which 
produced deleterious effects has been eliminated by natural selection over 
long periods of time. The cultural materialist claim that culturally 
determined behaviour can be "explained" in the same way rests on the 
assumption that conceptual schemes unfavourable to subsistence and 
reproduction are eliminated by natural selection in just the same way as 
genes. This assumption is highly dubious, given the relatively fast rate of 
cultural as compared to biological change, intra-generational learning, and 
the coexistence of very different cultures in the same natural environment. 
7 Other writers who deserve more attention than I can-give them here are 
"political economists" such as Wolf and Mintz, whose early focus on peasant 
societies caught up in national political movements and the world economy 
anticipated and indeed stimulated much current writing on these matters. 
8 Foucault's call for a theory of strategies without subjects may be 
understood in this sense: certain practices require those engaged in them to 
continually expand the sphere of application of those practices. For 
Foucault, power relations are embodied in the discursive practices of the 
disciplines and are embedded in the non-discursive practices of institutions. 
These disciplines and institutions produce both a certain type of known object 
and a certain type of knowing subject: neither the motivations of the subject 
nor the structure of the object can serve as the point of departure in 
historical explanation. 
9 It is quite true, as Ortner states, that using "history" as a cover term 
only hides important distinctions between theoretical approaches (159). 
Indeed, each approach will generate its own sort of historical methodology., 
The Oxford school has long adhered to a sort of historical particularism as a 
means of recovering primordial cultural patterns which have broken down under 
the impact of modernity, or as a means of demonstrating the continuity of the 
unique world views through the ages (cf Dumont , 1972 [1966] : 242) . 
10 A related situation arises "when class differences are also, historically, 
cultural differences", as a result of colonial conquest (cf 0rtner,155). In 
this case the "culture" of the masses may have a greater relative autonomy 
from the "culture" of the rulers than in cases where class differentiation 
arose more gradually within a society, and may allow for the more violent 
structural changes if an indigenous class of rulers is able to replace the 
foreign one. But it may equally be the case that local conceptual schemes are 
simply irrelevant to the objective functioning of power and succeed in 
producing only futile millenarian type movements, while dominated classes with 
a more accurate understanding of the way the dominant system operates are more 
successful in undermining it. 
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In "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties," Sherry Ortner (1984) 
contrasts the current anthropological interest in "practice"--an orientation 
focusing on various actor-oriented issues of "praxis, action, interaction, 
activity, experience, performance" (p. 144) and on historical issues of "time, 
process, duration, reproduction, development, evol~~ion, transformation" (p. 
158)--to earlier perspectives emphasizing essentially ahistoric structures of 
rules and roles constraining human thought and action. Such structural 
approaches, she argues, "established the reality of the thinglike nature of 
society, but . . . failed to ask, in any systematic way, where the thing comes 
from and how it might change" (p. 159) . In general, she sees a transformation 
since the 60s from an emphasis on "structures and systems to persons and 
practices" or from "static, synchronic analyses to diachronic, processual 
ones" as positive and theoretically invigorating (p. 158). She explicitly 
notes (p. 158) that her historical discussion is far from a disinterested 
inquiry. Rather, her selective discussion of various schools, approaches, and 
meta-orientations suggests that the most fruitful line for future 
anthropological research is the elaboration of a general, unified theory of 
practice (at present less a coherent theory than an emerging set of concerns) 
that will explore, in a systematic way, complex questions about "the impact of 
the system on practice, and the impact of practice on the system" (p. 148). 
Much could be said about Ortner's discussions of particular schools and 
approaches, both within periods of time and across time. Her view of 
anthropology since the 60s as a field in transition, even fragmentation, is 
incontestible. Marxists, self-reflective new ethnographers, world systems 
proponents, postmodern discourse analysts, and feminist anthropologists often 
seem to lack a common ground even for fruitful arguments. Here, however, I 
would like to explore further Ortner's historical interpretation of the causes 
and meanings of this fragmentation. My own selective comments are themselves 
far from disinterested. This paper aims to present an alternate historical 
analysis, with fundamental implications for understanding the current state of 
anthropological theory and for suggesting fertile areas and directions for 
future theoretical and ethnographic work. Basically, I will be questioning 
the possibility and desirability of developing a unified, general theory of 
practice at all, at least in the sense that Ortner suggests in her paper. I 
argue that her reflections on general relations between "the system" and "the 
practice" of human beings are largely framed in terms of one particular 
culture's construction of the world, one particular dominant mode of bringing 
together outside and inside, objective world and interested actor. A more 
powerful theoretical agenda for the 90s would involve rethinking the 
problematic, but still fundamental anthropological notion of "culture" in 
order to explore and systematically compare very different modes of making and 
unmaking humanly constructed, historically developing worlds. Within 
different sorts of cultural worlds, the relations of "structure, agency and 
history" take on very strange and convoluted shapes that a general theory of 
"the system" and its relation to "practice" does more to obscure than to 
illuminate. 
Ortner does not systematically explore the links between global social, 
economic and political transformations and changes in anthropological theory 
since the 60s, but she does suggest (p. 138) that radical social movements of 
the late 60s--for example, the counter-culture, anti-war and wornem's 
movements--prompted many anthropologists to ask questions about their own 
social world, the ways it was changing, possibilities for conscious 
intervention in social change, and the degrees to which our theoretical 
frameworks "embody and carry forward the assumptions of bourgeois Western 
culture." I suggest that the foundations of a more powerful and systematic 
analysis of the social/historical context of anthropological theory since the 
60s can be framed in terms of general theories of "late capitalism" as a 
fundamental reorganization of capitalist structure and practice dating from 
the late 60s and early 70s. (see Harvey 1985a and b, Mandel 1987.) Such 
theories begin to help us to see why the relations between "structure and 
history" or "structure and' practice" are so deeply problematic to us and 
why many anthropologists, concerned with the experiences and perceptions of 
people "on the ground," should be more concerned today with questions of 
persons, practices and history than with the delineation of coherent social or 
cultural systems. 
David Harvey (1985 a and b) discusses major shifts in the political 
economy of "late" capitalism that seem to involve a new mode of capital 
reproduction and accumulation and new sorts of "structured coherences" of 
time, space, urban life and social consciousness. After a long postwar boom, 
with its relatively coherent structures of big business, industrial production 
and controlled markets and its "standardised mode of capital accumulation," a 
series of economic and political crises in the early 70s led to a new "regime 
of flexible accumulation," characterized by a startling diversity and 
flexibility of labor processes, labor markets, products and patterns of 
consumption. New "coping mechanisms"--from black and underground economies to 
systems of home work and a vast array of small entrepeneurial endeavors-- 
introduced new ways of producing goods and especially services. The move to 
late capitalism involved rapid shifts in traditional patterns of uneven 
development--both between sectors of the economy (such as skilled 
manufacturing and unskilled service sectors) and between geographical regions 
(cities, regions, states and global sectors)--that were aided by the rapid 
evolution of new financial systems and markets. Relations among industrial, 
merchant, property and finance capital shifted drastically, as new and 
expanded credit hierarchies greatly increased the power of finance capital and 
contributed to the development of flexible, small-scale, competitive economic 
ventures on the ground. This new regime of flexible accumulation has been 
accompanied by political agendas stressing the virtues of free market 
competition and government deregulation. 
A full discussion of the recent transition to late or advanced 
capitalism (or post-industrial, postmodern or even, in some formulations, 
post-capitalist society) is obviously far beyond the scope of this paper, but 
it is clear that such a shift involves a multitude of contradictions in 
people's everyday experience and practice. However, Harvey and Mandel, among 
many others, would argue that while the dissolution of previously stable 
structures and moves to flexible practice are the most immediately perceived 
aspects of a late capitalist transformation, we can see behind free market 
competition, deregulation and innovative economic action--or rather, as 
operating throuqh them--key government interventions and vast waves of 
mergers, corporate consolidations, and linkages between supposedly rival firms 
in automobile, electronics and financial firms. These suggest not so much a 
destructuring move to flexible practice as a world-wide restructurinq of an 
ever more concentrated and centralized capitalist system. Harvey's argument 
is that late capitalism is a structure ever more tightly organized throush 
dispersal, geographic mobility and flexible responses in labor markets, 
processes and consumer markets. Capitalism as a system has always been 
reorganized through crises, and contemporary instability cannot be taken as a 
sign of disorganization. 
Late capitalist political economic transformations can be linked to new 
sorts of acting "selves," to new structures of experienced need and libidinous 
desire. An increasing gap between the very rich and a swelling category of 
the poor, the homeless and "the needy" renders this period of transformation 
one that is experienced by many as a time of general insecurity, profound loss 
and the breakdown of coherent structure. Even favored beneficiaries of recent 
economic changes, the much-maligned "yuppies," seem to live in uncertain and 
unstable worlds, motivated to work incessantly, often in jobs they dislike, by 
the promise of some peak sensual moment of consumption that will make all the 
rest worthwhile. 
The shift from liberal to late capitalism can be seen not only in 
capitalist political economic structures and in experiences and practices of 
people on the ground, but also within the realm of general academic 
"discourses" that cross-cut disciplinary boundaries. Ortner (pp. 144-5) notes 
a rethinking since the 60s of the field of structural linguistics, as many 
linguists have moved towards a view of language with greater emphasis on 
communication and performance. This reorientation resonates with similar 
moves to more "action-based" analyses in sociology, literature and 
anthropology. A "deconstructive" move to practice orientations is manifested 
in many other realms as well--for example, in postmodern or performance art or . 
in a postmodern architecture that is highly critical of traditional 
international style design and favors instead an eclectic vernacular style 
more responsive to changing local practices and histories. 
There are important, though admittedly tortuously complex, links between 
such sea changes in intellectual discourses and the late capitalist 
transformations mentioned above. It makes sense that many anthropologists, 
concerned with the experience, consciousness and practice of people in local 
communities, should formulate their own perceptions of recent historical 
transformations in terms of a theoretical shift from structure to practice and 
history. However, in light of theories of late capitalist transformation that 
see "flexible practices'' as the means by which capitalism is being reorganized 
on an unprecedented global scale as a system characterized by new forms of 
integration and constraint, we may suspect that various forms of "practice 
anthropology" tell only part of the story. 
Ortner (p. 144) notes that for strategic reasons, she places her- 
discussion of a more structure-oriented political economic approach in the 
70s, in order to emphasize the novelty of various practice approaches in the 
80s, even though a more historically accurate discussion would see both 
theoretical lines as developing side by side--often with very little 
interaction--into the 80s. I am inclined to see Ortner's attempt to 
characterize an emerging "practice anthropology" as an attempt to mediate 
between two concurrent, seemingly opposed approaches--one primarily concerned 
with the analysis of autonomous structures (in which action becomes mainly 
systematically constrained re-action) and the other primarily concerned with 
creative practice (sometimes to the extent of denying not only the power, but 
even the existence of coherent constraining systems). 
The first, structure-oriented approach is evident in the works of world 
systems proponents (for example, Eric Wolf's Euro~e and the PeoDle without 
pistorv (1982), in which "modes of production" often seem to take on 
independent existences of their own, and a capitalist mode of production seems 
to pull whole societies and cultures in its wake, dissolving and restructuring 
traditional worlds for its own uses). The second, action- and experience- 
oriented approach is represented in the works of various postmodern 
anthropologists (for example, in Clifford and Marcus' collection, Yritinq 
Cultures, in which various authors often seem to suggest that u structure we 
identify in other people's lives involves the illegitimate imposition of 
"ethnographic authority" onto the complex realities of creative local 
practices and multivalent discourses). 
To support these assertions adequately would lead me in directions far 
afield from the main line of my discussion of Ortner's paper. My main point 
here is that these seemingly polar forms of structure- and action-oriented 
approaches, world systems and postmodern anthropology, may be reconceived as 
two sides of the same late capitalist coin. As the "thinglike nature" of an 
earlier structure of capitalism is being broken down, a new "thing," whose 
dimensions and possible historical developments we are only beginning to 
glimpse, is being formed. Narrowly structure-oriented political economic 
theories tend to reify a global system that seems to take on a natural 
objective existence independent of conscious human practice. Some postmodern 
anthropologists, on the other hand, simply ignore or dismiss "the system" as 
an ideological construct, precisely because its global scope and complex forms 
of integration place its structure as a whole far outside the experience and 
intellectual grasp of any particular actor. Neither approach allows us to 
understand new forms of integration, contradiction or incoherence in the newly 
emerging system, nor new forms of consciousness, interest and motivation as 
local actors variously encounter, conceptualize, question and respond to 
changing circumstances of their everyday lives. 
In stressing either structure systematically unrestricted creative 
action, these approaches forfeit the possibility of envisioning truly 
different cultural modes of relating world and self, system and practice. For 
world systems theorists, the real connections among people are economic and 
political: "culture" (in the form of religion, ethnicity or other 
transparently "symbolic" domains) becomes merely a reservoir of symbols to be 
strategically picked out and used to further the real interests of political 
economic actors. A notion of culture as a particular society's mode of 
constructing meaningful actors and objects and of organizing their culturally 
significant relations in time is dismissed as merely an illegitimate 
analytical concept that obscures the real material connections of men and 
nature around the globe. Actors here become the "self-interested, rational, 
pragmatic" reproducers of structures that Ortner sees'-as represented in an' 
ethnocentric "interest theory" of motivation. "What actors do, it is assumed, 
is rationally go after what they want, and what they want is what is 
materially and politically useful for them within the context of their 
cultural and historical situations" (~rtner, p. 15 1) . 
Though postmodern anthropologists seek, in contrast, to celebrate the 
incommensurable differences among people's experiences, motivations and 
singular voices, they cannot offer a radical challenge to structure-oriented 
views. There is an equal danger here of simply dissolving "the other" into 
"us," insofar as unwillingness to impose our representational structures on 
the realities of others' lives shades into an unwillingness to recognize and 
represent the structures actually made by people in the course of their 
collective histories. 
Ortner's development of a "practice approach," not in owosition to the 
study of systems or structures, but as its necessary complement (p. 146), is 
clearly an attempt to go beyond the static opposition of approaches that 
emphasize either structure structurally unconstrained and undefined action. 
She argues (p. 159) "that society is a system, that the system is powerfully 
constraining, and yet that the system can be made and unmade through human 
action and interaction." She maintains (p. 154) that "a unified theory of 
practice" should ideally be able to account for both historical reproduction 
and transformation, constraining system and active practice within a single 
framework. 
Her whole discussion of "practice anthropology" is framed in terms of 
merging, interpenetrating or cross-fertilizing metaphors. To pick out just a 
few, she notes that a practice approach represents the theoretical merser of 
Marxist and Weberian, materialist and idealist approaches (p. 147). She wants 
to see a cross-fertilizatioq between "sociologically oriented practice 
accounts, with their relatively denatured views of motive," and "more richly 
textured accounts of emotion and motivation" developed within a tradition of 
symbolic anthropology that has had problems dealing with questions of 
political economy, history and institutional practice (p. 151). 
Ortner is clearly grappling throughout her paper with the dominant 
social problem of our world, the existing and possible relations between a 
powerfully constraining, seemingly monolithic external system and internally 
motivated, creative local practices. It is little wonder that Giddens (quoted 
in Ortner, p. 145) has dubbed the relation between "structure and agency" one 
of the central problems of modern social theory. 
My problem with all this is the idea that our theoretical agenda for the 
90s--and beyond--should focus on developing a general, unified theory of 
practice, concerned with relations between "the system" and "the practice" of 
diverse actors, that is supposed to help us make sense not only of dominant 
system/practice relations in our own "late capitalist" world, but also, in 
Ortner's terms, of "the practices and modes-of dominated groups that to 
varying degrees 'escape' or at least 'resist' the 'prevailing hegemony"' 
(~rtner, p. 155). It seems to me that insofar as we do not adequately deal 
with the social/historical contexts of our current theoretical concerns and 
formulations, we are likely to posit as foundations of a "general, unified 
practice theory" forms of "system and practice" that are really more specific 
to our own world, thus blinding us to just those modes of consciousness and 
action that might pose the greatest challenge to "hegemonic" forms of world 
creation and destruction. 
Ortner is clearly worried about the persistent Western slant of much 
current "practice anthropology," putting less emphasis on the heroic project 
by which "man makes himself" than on aspects of practice related to the "hard 
times of today: pragmatism, maximization of advantage, 'every man for 
himself"' (p. 160). She argues (p. 148) against assuming a priori divisions 
of the social world into base and superstructural domains that seem to 
characterize our own world, and she maintains (p. 157) the importance of 
looking for "patterns of cooperation, reciprocity, and solidarity" alongside 
more individually rationalizing and maximizing forms of interested action. 
Nevertheless, her own discussion of general practice theory continually 
reveals the distinctively Western cultural foundations of a preoccupation with 
how "the system" relates to "the practice" of interested actors. She notes 
(p. 148) that while the system is a relatively seamless, integral whole, "at . 
the same time all of its parts or dimensions do not have equal analytical 
significance. At the core of the system, both forming it and deforming it, 
are the specific realities of asymmetry, inequality, and domination in a given 
time and place." There is a tendency to see the most important aspects of 
structure as "constraint, hegemony, symbolic domination" (p. 147), while the 
most important forms of practice are "those with intentional or anintentional 
political implications" (p. 149) . 
Ortner wants to develop practice theory in a direction that goes beyond 
a mere reflection of Western categories and assumptions, to see "the system" 
as potentiating as well as constraining and to envision practice as complexly 
motivated, in culturally variable ways by no means congruent with Western 
notions of natural, individual interests. Still, it seems to me that 
general theory of practice seeking to Prins tosether system and action sets 
out with a whole world of assumptions about what they are and how they differ, 
about the boundaries between external structure and inner being, form and 
content, objects and subjects, that theoretically blinds us to radically 
different cultural worlds. It is just not enough to hope for a "cross- 
fertilization" between sociologically and symbolically oriented accounts of 
self and world or for a "merger" of materialist and idealist approaches. Such 
hopes seem to me still to be caught within what Ortner (p. 134) recognizes as 
"pervasive schemes of Western thought: subjective/objective, nature/culture, 
mind/body," and to forfeit the distinctively anthropological promise to bring 
these schemes to consciousness as only one culture's mode of being and world- 
making. 
While I have argued that Ortner's general discussion of practice theory 
can be illuminated by contextualizing it within the problematic dichotomy of 
system and practice characterizing late capitalism, this seemingly "natural" 
division can be traced, in various forms, much further back into the early 
history of western culture. Saint Augustine's Citv of God explores relations 
between the "City of God" and the "City of Man," between spirit and flesh, 
mind and body, already constituted as separate things. Human society, as the 
"pale shadow" of heavenly order, is already constituted here as a coercive and 
constraining system,-necessary to keep fallen, self-interested individual. 
actors within orderly bounds. The deepest inner thoughts and motivations of 
every indivudal are impenetrable to others, although men are constrained to 
work together to produce the objective conditions of their physical survival. 
Each man is a limited being, working alongside others, though not in any real 
communion with them, in order to wrest physical necessities from a 
"disenchanted" external nature, a world that God created and then abandoned 
without a spirit or spirits of its own. The cultural roots of the opposition 
between "structure and agency" are indeed deep and convoluted. 
Our dominant cultural project is production, a project that stresses 
"natural" divisions between nature and human will, world and self. Our 
cultural problem is connection, and edifices of connection tend to be seen as 
constraining "systems." Much of my own work has'focused on an interpretation 
of early accounts of Scandinavian Sami (~app) hunters and fishers. Obviously, 
this is not the place for an extended ethnographic exploration, but I am 
increasingly convinced that a key to understanding this Sami world is a vision 
of their dominant "cultural project" as something like "ritual 
transformation," with material production and political negotiation as 
subordinate concerns. Divisions between individuals and objects, person and 
person, even humans and gods, were seen as provisional, temporary 
constellations, appropriate in certain contexts of action. But underlying all 
this was a real unity of substance: the blood of human beings was the same 
blood that coursed through the bodies of animals and indeed the same "blood of 
the land" that coursed through the body of the world. Their cultural problem, 
I believe, was the necessity for perpetually making and remaking significant 
differentiations--between hunters and prey, men and women, Sami and outsiders- 
-in this substantially unified world, and holding these distinctions 
sufficiently steady in their appropriate contexts for an ordered, predictable 
social life to unfold temporally within a world always threatening to collapse 
time and difference into itself. 
Sami hunters developed an elaborate complex of practices centered upon the 
act of seeing. In certain highly charged ritual contexts, people looked 
through brass rings in order to control the potentially dangerous connection 
between seer and things seen that was believed to be created by the visual act 
itself. Likewise, the production of sound--for example, in shamanic ritual 
drumming--was a potent means of extending the boundaries of the active self to 
incorporate other human beings, land and animals formerly seen as outside the 
drummer. As ritual drumming produced waves of sound that moved out through 
the earth, various "external structuresu--territorial boundaries, divisions 
between household groups and Sami communities--could be symbolically 
incorporated within collective Sami actors and could be remade according to 
consciously transformative intention. 
The point here is that because structures in the world were seen as only 
provisional and to a large extent created by human action, they could be 
periodically made and unmade with a facility and transparency that seem 
extraordinary to us. People could be regularly redistributed among 
territories and hunting areas reallocated among human groups, not simply in 
the interests of practical material or political advantage, but according to 
Sami notions of "what constitutes goodness--in people, in relationships, and 
in conditions of life" (~rtner, p. 152). Within this sort of world, the 
relations of "structure, agency and history" have temporal, contextual 
dimensions that, it seems to me, would be difficult to illuminate by any 
general theory of "the system" (especially one conceived primarily as natural 
or political constraint) and its relation to "practice" (conceived as, 
pragmatically interested actions). Indeed, it is precisely such theoretical 
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assumptions that have led to a dominant understanding of Sami hunters (and of 
other Arctic peoples) as archetypal pragmatists, engaged in a never-ending 
struggle for survival that leaves them little time for a complex cultural 
life--a notion that may serve self-affirming purposes for western analysts, 
but does not go very far in making even superficial sense of the complex 
ethnographic material. 
It seems to me that in order to transcend the persistent western 
opposition between system and practice, if only partially and conceptually 
within the realm of anthropological theory and ethnographic understanding, we 
need theories that emphasize complex ethnographi'c understandings of' the 
different historical dynamics associated with different modes of world-making 
and experience. Ortner suggests something of this sort when she states (p. 
149) that "practice theory seeks to explain . . . the genesis, reproduction, 
and change of form and meaning of a given social/cultural whole." No general 
theory of the relations between system and practice, or between structure and 
history, could account for such phenomena, which become intelligible only in 
terms of specific cultural worlds and fields of social action. 
It is interesting that much of the attention focused on Sahlins' 
elaboration of. "structure and history" in Oceania arises from a desire for a 
general "model which derives systemic change from changes in practices" 
(Ortner, p. 155). The more interesting and far-reaching part of his argument 
is that history "works" differently in different sorts of societies. Hawaiian 
"heroic history" works differently from Western capitalist history, because 
different cultural schemes of significance and desired ends of action 
constitute qualitatively different sorts of actors with different interests, 
within worlds in which the practice of various kinds of actors is 
differentially weighted in its potential historical significance. In "heroic 
societies," quarrels or marriages of kings become wars or alliances between 
kingdoms. Here, the "Great Man" theory of historical explanation actually 
seems to work, as long as we remember that heroic "Great Men" are not 
rational, maximizing Western individuals. Rather, they act in terms of a 
"cultural self" constituted less as a creative individual actor, than as a re- 
enactor of mythological narratives of gods, with whom divine kings are 
substantially connected and through whom the bodies of kings become the 
foundation for a substantial integration of people in society. 
In contrast, "natural" divisions in Western culture constitute fixed 
boundaries between individuals and between God and man. Human society becomes 
an aggregate of individuals, rather than a substantially integrated entity, 
and western history "works" according to a very different dynamic. Here, it 
takes the combined practice of aggregates of individuals, acting at particular 
moments of structurally produced political/economic crisis, to effect social 
revolutions. "Great Men" become merely the particular representatives of 
"external" historical forces. (See Sahlins 1981 and 1983.) 
Again, the crucial point here is that a general "practice theory" 
(inevitably incorporating, in its very formulation, fundamental western 
assumptions about "the system" and "the practice" of individual actors) could 
not go very far towards illuminating particular heroic or western worlds, and 
the ways and reasons they are historically made and unmade, reproduced and 
transformed. Rather than seeing development of a general, unified practice 
theory as a theoretical agenda for the 90s (and beyond), I think a more 
productive direction would be theoretical exploration of different sorts of 
cultural dynamics--different modes by which actors and objects, selves and 
worlds are constituted and brought into relation in various contexts of action 
directed towards particular ends (for example, economic production, political 
negotiation or ritual transformation) and different modes by which various 
cuitural contexts and particular ends are themselves related. This would 
allow us to distinguish, for example, between western culture, with its 
dominant cultural project of material production and accumulation, and other 
cultures with fundamentally different "kingdoms of ends" or "images and ideals 
of what constitutes goodness--in people, in relationships, and in conditions 
of life" (Ortner , p. 152) . 
Many anthropologists today are wary of the term "culture," given as many 
different meanings and functions in social life as there are anthropological 
schools or approaches. Ortner's article suggests a number of.these, ranging 
from "culture" as a "distinctive flavor, an ethos" that stamps one's "sense of 
self, of social relations and of conduct" (p. 129), to culture as an internal 
logic of symbols and meanings, essentially cut off from action, to a set of 
symbolic operators in various social processes with their own realities, to an 
ideological reflection of more fundamental political economic realities. She 
also suggests a notion of culture as a human mode of constituting whole 
worlds, and this is the sense of "culture"--as a mode in which various 
collectivities meaningfully constitute subjects and objects, inside and 
outside, self and world--that I'd like to develop here. It makes sense that 
in a kind of cultural world such as our own, with its historically developed, 
systemically dominant opposition between external structure and internal being 
or mind and body that there would arise theoretical debates about whether 
"culture" is some sort of "superorganic entity" or something merely "inside" 
individuals, and if the latter, whether it is really a structured set of 
cognitive rules and roles or a more subjective, affective "ethos" or stylistic 
orientation. 
A broader, more comparatively powerful notion of "culture" would require 
exploration of modes of world-making that could not be confined to just the 
way people think or feel "inside." Culture, in terms of this broader 
understanding, .& embodied in inner feelings, motivations, forms of libidinous 
desire and physical need, as well as represented within individual cognitive 
frameworks. But it is also manifested "outside," in constructions of 
"humanized nature," giving a particular form and magnitude to the structures 
of "objective circumstance." It is present "outside" in the structures of 
humanly built environments or in humanly constituted political institutions 
that seem to gain a kind of life and internal dynamic of their own. The point 
here is that as soon as we talk about culture in general, we must move to 
considerations of cultures in particular, because it is only in the context of 
the latter that we can make sense of particular configurations of external 
constraint, inner possibility, evolutionary tendencies and historical 
dynamics. 
Ortner (p. 143) notes, in opposition to a capital-centered view of the 
world, that "the attempt to view other systems from ground level is the basis, 
perhaps the only basis, of anthropology's distinctive contribution to the 
human sciences." Such a "ground level" basis for ethnographic fieldwork has 
often been identified with the analysis of a local community, of a particular 
constellation of practices, interactions, world views and differentially 
valued ends of action. It is on the basis of such ground level analyses, I 
have argued, that many anthropologists, in the period of late capitalism, see 
traditional structures of self and world as breaking up (or as never having 
actually existed at all) and struggle to make sense of their ground level 
visions through theoretical moves from structure practice. In contrast, I 
have suggested that what we are seeing in the move to late capitalism are new 
sorts and levels of integrated structure, new constraints on and possibilities 
for local practice, and a relation between seemingly opposed "levels" of 
structure and practice that is rendered increasingly problematic and opaque to 
actors within the system. For anthropologists today to understand "local 
practices on the ground," intensive, local fieldwork is essential, but not 
sufficient. We also need a comparative theory of broadly cultural "modes of 
production" that allows us to penetrate the fundamental assumptions of 
western, capitalist culture and the ways these have developed historically to 
global proportions. "Culture" here is not a localized, bounded entity, but a 
particular mode of making (and periodically unmaking and reconstituting) a 
world. 
Despite various dire predictions that the development of global 
capitalism would inaugurate an era of "monoculture," manifest differences 
between local groups, regional societies and national cultures seem, if 
anything, more pronounced than ever before--an observation that should not 
surprise us, given an understanding of late capitalist concentration and 
centralization proceeding on the basis of competition between groups, some of 
whom have become very proficient in the strategic employment of "cultural 
symbols" and "ethnicity" in pursuit of material and political advantage. 
Kayapo Indians in Brazil, native Fijian politicians, and Scandinavian Sami 
reindeer herders speak today in remarkably similar ways about their 
"cultures," often as if they were external forms or markers that people could 
simply put on or take off in different contexts. During my own fieldwork in 
northern Scandinavia, I pondered the motivations of a Sami reindeer owner, 
with a pocket of business cards printed with his name and the English words, 
"Reindeer Products, Inc.," who drove to the local airport in his new Mercedes 
to fly to Australia for a meeting of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 
where he would don traditional clothes, sing traditional Sami songs, and 
bemoan the incursions of "Western culture" into his own "indigenous culture, 
living in harmony with nature." An obvious lesson here is that.we should 
never underestimate the power of western capitalism to penetrate into other 
worlds, to transform the threat of truly different cultural modes of being 
into "ethnic" or narrowly "cultural" differences that merely reinforce, rather 
than fundamentally challenge capitalist cultural hegemony. 
Nevertheless, as Ortner (p. 155) observes, at least some of the 
practices and modes of dominated groups, or of groups Only partially or 
peripherally incorporated Lnto a capitalist "world system," escape or resist 
the prevailing hegemony. A major problem is, however, that without a theory 
that allows us to make systematic comparisons among different cultural modes 
of constituting worlds and making histories, we are unable to judge whether 
various practices represent escapes from or alternatives to "the prevailing 
hegemony" or merely local differences that feed into and help to reproduce a 
late capitalist system. Indeed, we are left unable to illuminate the 
particular nature of "relationship(s) that obtain between human action, on the 
one hand, and some global entity which we may call 'the system"' (~rtner, p. 
148) in the prevailing hegemony itself. 
There are still infinite possibilities for ethnographic research into 
truly different cultural modes of constituting self, world and history--both 
within non-western communities profoundly affected, though not totally 
transformed by "the world system" a within the late capitalist system 
itself. "A regime of flexible accumulation," no matter how integral to 
current capital restructuring, also opens up new places for alternative 
visions and practices. and for various forms of "counter-hegemonic resistance!' 
as people "on the ground" variously experience, question, seek'to understand 
and adapt to or transform the changing circumstances of their everyday lives. 
Rich possibilities for ethnographic work exist now, for example, in the 
contemporary women's movement, in connection with new constellations of 
religion and politics, in newly emerging coalitions of environmental and human 
rights activists. For the most part, general theories of late capitalism 
simply assume that the consciousness and practice of people in new 
circumstances will change in theoretically predictable ways. Insofar as they 
don't, something we can only know through careful ethnographic study, these 
general theories themselves will have to be revised and reformulated. 
A general "practice orientation" that does not just assume that people 
act in ways that simply reflect "the system" is enormously useful in doing 
ethnography, but it is not an adequate foundation for future anthropological 
theory building. I would argue instead that it is only in terms of a 
comparative vision of different cultural dynamics that we can begin to locate 
current forms of "practice anthropology" within the historical development of 
one particular--and from an anthropologically comparative perspective very 
peculiar--mode of cultural production. Moreover, it is in terms of such 
theoretical comparisons that we can make sense of the local practices, persons 
and histories that we study around the globe as, predominantly, aspects of a 
capital-centered cultural mode or of truly alternative cultural projects. 
What would it take for us to reclaim the "late capitalist system" now emerging 
as an historical product of human intention and meaningful action? What sorts 
of critical perspectives might be brought to bear upon the dominant western, 
capitalist mode of constituting and relating "system and practice"? Are there 
new points of contradiction and incoherence in "the system" that might be 
critical areas for new sorts of practices, aimed not just at the reproduction 
of dominant structures, but at their transformation? 
These are all questions that Ortner clearly wants to illuminate through 
her discussion of newly emerging "practice approaches" in anthropology. I 
hope it is clear from my own far from disinterested comments on Ortner's paper 
that I have great admiration for what she sets out to do in this paper--to 
make integrated, historically grounded sense of a seemingly fragmented field 
in the interests of clarifying potentially significant areas for future 
research and theoretical development and ultimately, of providing the 
foundations for a truly critical anthropology. Her willingness to put herself 
on the intellectual firing line in this session is equally praiseworthy. My 
criticisms center around how accurately her discussion.of an overall move to' 
"practice anthropology" characterizes the recent history of anthropological 
theory and how positive and theoretically invigorating such a move really is. 
I would like to see in the coming decades much more attention given to the 
social/historical contexts of our current theoretical concern with issues of 
practice and history, and of our skepticism about the usefulness of received 
anthropological notions of system, structure, organizing principle, cultural 
order. How might we redefine and rework the elusive, but I believe still 
fundamentally central, anthropological notions of "culture" and "cultural 
difference" to meet our present, historically and culturally constituted, 
theoretical needs? 
The point I'd like to end with here is that any workable notion of 
comparative culture in contemporary anthropological theory would have to take 
account of criticisms of the "culture as constraining system" concept 
developed from within current "practice approaches." Culture could no longer 
be simply identified with a clearly delimited community or society on the 
ground, with an unproblematically integrated structure of rules and roles that 
people simply enact, or with a set of beliefs or patterns of behavior that are 
unproblematically shared by all actors. The hope would be that while drawing 
much from current practice approaches, the further development of comparative 
cultural theory could itself illuminate those .approaches, as one culture's 
attempt to make sense of the dominant social problems of its time--the 
existing and possible relations among structure, human agency and history. "A 
lot of work, " as Ortner (p. 160) notes, "remains to be done. " 
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SCIENTIFIC FIELD AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 
Marginal Notes on Sherry B. Ortner's article 
"Theory in Anthropology since the ~ixties"'~ 
by Pierre Bourdieu 
College de France 
 ransl slated from the French by Loic J. D. Wacquant. A few comments and 
cursory observations jotted down rapidly with the liberty of improvisation 
allowed by the 0-ral presentation that I would like to have been able to 
deliver in person in order to express the great esteem in which I hold Sherry 
ortner's synthesis. 
SCIENTIFIC FIELD AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 
Sherry Ortner divides the recent history of anthropology in three 
decades: structuralism in the sixties, a return to Marx and structural 
Marxism in the seventies, and to "practice" in the eighties. This convenient 
classification is premised on a Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of the history of 
science which tends to portray scientific undertakings as being closely 
dependent upon a sort of intellectual Zeitseist (others would say a fad) and 
to consider that the products of such undertakings are directly determined by 
the most general historical conditions1 and, being bound to them, are thus 
doomed to disappear with them. In fact, all the remainder of the article 
seems to me to belie this philosphy which we tend to accept with too little 
thought. There is in reality an autonomous history of scientific problems and 
solutions because there is an autonomous history of scientific fields 
(conceived as fields of forces and fields of struggles) in which these 
problems and solutions are produced. (one cannot proceed directly from the 
expansion of the sixties to structuralism or from the student movement to the 
demise of this current.) A question essential to the understanding of 
scientific production is that of the practical limits of these fields which 
are cut up along disciplinary boundaries and national traditions. si ere, the 
logic of trend-report tends to bring into coexistence areas of research which 
have developed in total independence from one another within the limits either 
of a given disciplinary subfield--anthropology, sociology or philosophy--or 
"Like any theory, it is a product of its time. Once practice had the 
romantic aura of voluntarism: 'man,' as the saying went, 'makes himself.' 
Now practice has qualities related to the hard times of today: pragmatism, 
maximization of advantage, 'every man,' as the saying goes, 'for himself.' 
Such a view seems natural in the context of the sixtiesand seventies and in 
the context of a disastrous economy and a heated-up nuclear threat." (~rtner, 
p. 160). 
even within the limits of a national disciplinary subfield, insofar as these 
disciplinary fields are not fully internationalized.) 
Indeed, the oppositions, at once social and intellectual, which arise 
within each field and which are often incarnated in names of schools and even 
names of scholars that serve as sign-posts, often form the principles of 
structuration of the dominant problematic at a given moment in time and 
consequently the foundation of a consensus which binds together the various 
cultural producers in a given field. I shall refer here to the excellent 
analysis of .the conflict between the cultural ecologists and the symbolic 
anthropologists put forward by Sherry Ortner: 
Whereas the cultural ecologists considered the symbolic 
anthropologists to be fuzzy-headed mentalists, involved in 
unscientific and unverifiable flights of subjective 
interpretation, the symbolic anthropologists considered cultural 
ecology to be involved with mindless and sterile scientism, 
counting calories and measuring rainfall, and willfully ignoring 
the one truth that anthropology had presumably established by that 
time: that culture mediates all human behavior. The manichean 
struggle between 'materialism' and 'idealism,' 'hard' and 'soft' 
approaches, interpretive 'emics' and explanatory 'etics', 
dominated the field for a good part of the decade of the sixties, 
and in some quarters well into the seventies. (~rtner, p ~ .  a., 
p. 134) 
These social oppositions functioned as principles of vision and division 
("most of us thought and wrote in terms of such oppositions," writes Sherry 
~rtner), as schemes of constructkon of reality, very similar in this respect 
to the "primitive forms of classification" dear to Durkheim and Mauss and to 
the pairs of oppositions of the "savage mind'' analyzed by Levi-Strauss. (1t 
is no doubt because it arises withirscientific fields which function as 
I am prepared to defend the hypothesis that the distribution of the 
contenders between the two sides is not randomly generated and that 
significant relationships (statistically and semantically) could be found 
between the scientific stances taken up by various researchers and their 
positions (and trajectories) within the field (university of origin, academic 
rank, professional positions, etc.) and, by extension, their social origins. 
fields of struggles, battlefields, that thought is so Often organized around 
such pairs of antinomic concepts.)3 In the same way as the paired oppositions 
of dualist thought, they exert a closure effect: just as their proponents-- 
colluding adversaries--support each other in and through their antagonism 
("the emic/etic struggle of the sixties had a number of unfortunate effects, 
not the least of which was the prevention of adequate self-criticism on both 
sides of the fence. Both schools could luxuriate in the faults of the other 
and not inspect their own houses for signs of serious weakness," Ortner, 
m.), similarly, antinomic concepts, which often serve as insults, in their 
antagonism hide the fact that they tend to delimit the space of the thinkable 
by excluding the very intention to think beyond the divisions they institute. 
It is obvious that these oppositions which structure the field of a 
given discipline and the minds of all those who participate in it are in no 
way universal. Different oppositions operate within another discipline in the 
same country and within the same discipline in other countries. For example, 
among French anthropologists, during the same period, the main oppositions 
were very different even though the field of anthropology was undoubtedly more 
unified at that time than that of sociology or philosophy. As a result, many 
misunderstandings arise in the international circulation of "theories": 
indeed, as Marx himself pointed out long ago, texts circulate without their 
context, or, more precisely, they do not carry with them the scientific field 
within which they were constituted, i.e., the system of oppositions with 
reference to which they were defined and which varies by discipline, national 
tradition and intellectual generation.* These texts therefore have every 
Cf. P. Bourdieu, "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social 
Conditions of the Progress of Reason," S o c i a l -  1145 (1975) 
and "The Peculiar History of Scientific Reason" (forthcoming). 
* Thus one is often surprised by all the "errors of categorization" that 
Anglo-American readers are induced to make about the works of French authors 
chance of being read by readers who, being integrated into a different field, 
apprehend them through completely different schemes of perception and 
problematics. This fateful disjunction is all the more likely when the. 
temporal gap between original publication and translation further muddles 
synchronic relations. 
I was thus a bit taken aback to find myself placed in the "current 
practice trend" of the 1980's. Indeed, my book Outline of a Theory of 
~ractice,~ published in the early seventies but elaborated in the mid-sixties, 
i.e., at the heyday of structuralism, was explicitly conceived against two 
theoretic opponents which were just as deeply opposed to each other as were, 
at that time in the United States, the cultural ecologists and the symbolic 
anthropologists: on the one hand, structuralism, in its Levi-Straussian 
version or its structural-Marxist ~ersion,~ which took the structuralist 
philosophy of action to its limits by making explicit the theory of the agent 
as the mere support (Tra9er) of the structure; on the other hand, Sartrian 
existentialism, which no doubt stands as the most systematic and the most 
and about the authors themselves by virtue of being deprived of all the 
information on disciplinary affiliations, generations, academic origins, etc., 
which come with indigenous familiarity, or because they cling to erroneous or 
superficial reference points given by "travelers" and "jet ethnographersu-who 
believe themselves to be well informed simply because they have spent a couple 
of months in Paris listening, in their own language, to talks destined for 
foreign visitors, and whose accounts are then repeated again and again without 
verification (for example, the idea that Michel Foucault was once a "student" 
of Althusser. . .) . 
Geneva: Droz, 1972, and Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
"Structuralist Marxism" was not born, as might be inferred from Sherry 
Ortner's periodization, from a reaction against the structuralism of Levi- 
Strauss. Rather, it issued from the application of the structuralist mode of 
thinking to the reading of Marx and, through the influence of Althusser, to 
anthropology (where it wreaked havoc) and represents one of the manifestations 
(Foucault's oeuvre being another) of the domination that anthropology has 
exerted, through Levi-Strauss, on the totality of the intellectual field and 
on philosophy which had, until then, been dominant. (cf. P. Bourdieu, 
"Preface" to the English edition of Homo Academicus (cambridge: Polity Press, 
1988) . I  
radical expression ever given to the philosophy of the intentional subject. 
This is why I cannot without hesitation agree to be placed in the "practice 
trend'' of the eighties (however flattering it might be to be thus situated at 
the end, albeit provisional, of the "intellectual dialectic". . .) . 1n effect , 
and this is what I would now like to argue briefly, one cannot confound under 
the same concept, and a vague one at that, of "practice" the theory of habitus 
that I put forward and the very subjectivist theories of action (such as 
interactionism, ethnomethodology or Rational Action ~heory) asainst which it 
was conceived, no less than against the objectivist theories of the 
structuralist or structuralist-Marxist type. 
If it is true that the various fields are organized according to 
different oppositions which vary by discipline, national tradition and 
historical period, it nonetheless remains that there is a limited number of 
fundamental oppositions which, being inscribed in the nature of things, that 
is, in the very peculiar form assumed by the relation between the scientist 
and his or her object in the case of the social sciences, are found to 
underlie the various states of the intellectual field in a variety of forms. 
Such is the case with the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism: 
these two antagonistic points of view, like the oppositions between 
materialism and spiritualism or between physicalism and semiologism, in a way 
artifically mutilate the intrinsicallv double realitv of human existence as a 
thing of the world for which there are things. (1t is this fundamental 
anthropological reality which is well captured by Pascal when he says: "Le 
monde me comprend et m'aneantis comme un point, mais je le c0mprends"--the 
world encompasses me but I understand it.) And the logic of the fields of 
cultural production, to which. the scientific field is no exception., the .logic 
of orthodoxy and heresy, which incites newcomers to break with the dominant 
discourse, promotes false revolutions which are nothing more than switches 
from pro to anti, cyclical returns to a subjectivist phase after an 
objectivist phase and conversely. Thus, in sociology today, the reaction 
against the short-lived domination of an approach of the structuralist- 
objectivist type (to which some of my work in the sociology of education, 
Be~roduction in Education. Culture and Societv in particular, is mistakenly 
assimilated) inspires a return to a subjectivist conception of action against 
which the structuralist tendency had formed itself. I have in mind these 
trends which scholarly taxonomies sometimes gather under the label of 
"constructivism," and whichrange from the more.or less updated variants of 
symbolic interactionism or ethnomethodology that emphasize the contribution of 
agents to the construction of social realities, structures, social groups and 
so on, right up to forms of discourse analysis which forget to take into 
account the position of the locutors within the space of production and 
consumption of discourses. Likewise, in anthropology, the reaction against 
the hardest forms of structuralism and structural Marxism incline some to 
embrace a form .of subjectivist nihilism which, on the basis of a falsely 
radical critique of fieldwork, reduces discourse on the social world to a 
rhetoric wavering between the suspect charms of poetics and the underhand 
dealings of politics. 
In short, in the face of these pendular swings that have never stopped 
since the emergence of a science of the social world pretending to autonomy, 
one has the impression that history is repeating itself: thus the triumph, 
during the sixties in France, of the "philosphy without a subject" which 
asserts itself, at least among philosophers (~lthusser and Foucault in 
particular), in reaction against the philosophy of the subject, of free 
conscience, of project, which, with Sartre, had dominated the entire French 
intellecutal field in the fifties, seems like a come-back and revenge of 
Durkheim against whom, at least in part, the French philosophers of the 
generation of Sartre, Aron and Nizan, had defined their positions, by drawing 
on the phenomenology of Husserl and ~eidegger.~ This being said, for reasons 
that have to do with the quality of the protagonists and also with the 
progress of the intellectual experience accumulated within the field, the 
opposition between Sartre, who took subjectivi'sm to its breaking pointy9 and 
Levi-Strauss, who affirmed in the most provocative manner the philosophy of 
action inscribed in Durkheimian theory and extended by Saussure (with the 
notion of the unconscious), no doubt represents--or is this an illusion of 
familiarity?--the most accomplished expression of the opposition between 
objectivism and subjectivism. 
It is this opposition that I have sought to transcend. l o  Against the 
objectivism of action without an agent and history as a "process without a 
subject," and against the subjectivism for which action is the product of a 
conscious intention, the free project of a conscience positing its own ends or 
the rational calculation of a Bomo economicus guided by the search for the 
Cf . A. Boschetti, Sartre et "Les Temps Modernes": une. entr.e~ri-se 
intellectuelle. (paris: Editions de Minuit, 1985). English translation by 
Northwestern University Press, 1988. 
See P. Bourdieu and J. -C. Passeron, "Sociology and Philosophy in France 
Since 1945--Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without a Subject" Sociak 
R e s e a r c h  34: 1 (spring 1967) for a fuller discussion. 
So much so that anyone who has in mind Sartre's analyses of bad faith or of 
oaths will recognize the contortions of a Jon Elster, particularly in U ~ Y S S ~ S  
and the Sirens (cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, rev. ed. 1984), 
as the mediocre remake of a familiar show. 
l o  I have tried to explicate all the implications of this position, 
particularly with regard to temporality, in my book Le Sens Pratisue (paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1980, English translation forthcoming), in which I 
reexamine more systemaically and in greater depth the analyses presented in 
Outline of a Theorv of Practice. 
maximization of profit or, more largely, by the pursuit of his interest, I 
wished to put forth a theory of practice as the product o f a  "sens pratisue," 
of a "sense of the game," or, in a word, of habitus. By habitus, I meant a 
system of dispositions or, if you prefer, of schemes of perception, 
appreciation and action which are the product of the incorporation of 
objective structures and which, as long as the social games to which they are 
confronted are not radically different from the games in which they were 
constituted, allow one to anticipate the necessity immanent in the game, the 
tendencies inscribed in its very logic, in the manner of a wide receiver who 
finds himself right where the ball lands on a broken pass play; 
Within this framework, actions have as their principle asents (which 
does not mean, as Sherry Ortner suggests in the enumeration given on page 144, 
subjects, persons or actors--so many words which imply a philosophy of 
conscience, of intention) who do not need to posit their goals as such, as 
part of a conscious project or a rational plan, in order to produce actions 
that are reasonable--and this does not mean rational. Actions engendered by 
habitus can have an objective intention without being the product of an 
intention; the strategies suggested by habitus, like those of the accomplished 
player who anticipates the anticipations of his opponents and thereby beats 
them, are not the product of a strategic intention. Neither, for this matter, 
are they automatic reflexes, mechanical reactions or the mere execution of a 
programme inscribed in the structure. Being active, inventive, in the manner 
of the improvisations of a story-teller or an insipired orator, they are not 
the product of the conscious and calculated decisions of a creative invention: 
their principle is not explicit rules or procedures constituted into a method, 
but rather an a, "pure practice without theory," as Durkheim put it, a 
practical Lnodus operandi, which reveals itself Only in the opus oDeratumand 
which allows all kinds of inventions, but within the limits of a style, 
inscribed in the schemes of habitus. It would be necessary here again to 
specify the notion of interest: I hold'that interest emerges in the relation 
between a definite habitus and the social field whose structure and dynamics 
it embodies. l 1  This implies that there are as many forms of interest as there 
are fields: what, for a "well-socialized" Kabyle, is a matter of life an 
death, a crucial stake, might leave indifferent an agent lacking the 
principles of differentiation which enable him to make the difference and to 
be taken in by the games of honor. But this implies also and above all that 
the pursuit of interest does not presuppose, as one might believe by following 
the utilitarian philosophy associated with certain states of the economic 
field, the conscious positing of rationally-sought self-interested ends. 
(~ndeed, one could show that there are many social universes where 
disinterest, in the ordinary sense of the word, is a particularly effective 
way of satisfying one s "interests. ") l 
In order to capture the gist of human action, one must thus get rid of 
all the paired concepts (such as subject/object, thought/thing, 
conscious/unconscious, etc.) which block our thought and forbid us to grasp 
and adequately render the pntolosical ComDlicitv between the social agent (who 
is neither a subject nor a consciousness) and the social world (which is never 
a mere "thing"): social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in 
minds. And, as the relationship between the sense of the game and the 
An analysis of how this "fit" between habitus and field generates interest 
in the case of the literary field can be found in P. Bourdieu, "Flaubert's 
Point of View, I' Critical Insuirv 14 (spring 1988) . 
For an elaboration on this, cf . P. Bourdieu, "On Interest and the Relative 
Autonomy of Symbolic Power," Workins Papers and Proceedinss of the Center foy 
F s v c h o s o c i a l  20 (Chicago: Center for Psychosocial Studies, 1988) and 
"The Field of Cultural Production, or the Economic World Reversed," Poetics 12 
(1983) . 
becoming of the game clearly demonstrates, when habitus is confronted by a 
social world of which it is the product, it is in a certain way this reality 
which communicates with itself, below the level of discourse and 
consciousness, in a sort of "body-to-body" struggle (corps a corps). 
THEORY I N  ANTHROPOLOGY THREE YEARS LATER: 
A R e s p o n s e  t o  P a p e r s  
S h e r r y  B. O r t n e r  
Depa r tmen t  of A n t h r o p o l o g y  
U n i v e r s i t y  of M i c h i g a n  
Let me start off by saying that, to pre'serve my sanity, I had to start 
drafting these remarks about two weeks ago, when I had only one of the papers 
in hand  o om ~ibson's). (I can't complain too much since I have done the same 
thing to my discussants, when I was a panelist in other times and places.) 
This meant that I had to come up with a strategy for responding coherently to 
critiques of whose shape I had only the most vague and general idea. The 
strategy I settled on was this: After calling most of the panelists, I 
decided to focus on five terms that are key to the issues discussed in "Theory 
in Anthropology since the Sixties," terms so general that - I fervently hoped 
- they could not fail to correspond in some way to at least some of the 
critiques put forth by the panelists. The terms are: practice, structure, 
actor, reflexivity, and history. After seeing the papers I am reassured that 
these will cover a reasonable part of the territory, although there will 
necessarily be a number of important points that get missed. Hopefully these 
will be picked up later in the floor discussion. 
Before getting to the five terms, however, let me make a few general comments. 
First, I want to say that I feel very firmly situated by the panelists in my 
various contexts - global and local, epochal and historical. I cheerfully 
admit that my thinking operates within a society and a historical moment that 
carries all of the following baggage: Durkheim's distinction between the 
sacred and the profane; Freud's emphasis on the complexity of human emotional 
and sexual life; the Victorian emphasis on the opposition between domestic and 
public; the American cultural obsession with the individuaL and Americans.' 
near inability to conceive of structural rather than psychological 
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constraints; the American university system with its emphasis on the constant 
production of new and improved products; and late capitalist society which 
masks corporate and governmental consolidation behind an ideology of flexible 
opportunity and who-says-you-can't-have-it-all yuppieism. To this list I 
would add two situating moves derived from some earlier critiques of the 
theory paper: that my thinking must be situated in a context in which the 
colonial heritage of anthropology has become increasingly clear, and in which 
more and more anthropologists are working in so-called complex societies. And 
finally I add one that I emphasized myself in the paper: that we are all 
inheritors of the Sixties - of Vietnam, of Woodstock and the- Days of Rage - 
the impact of which is still unclear. To all this I would say that, while I 
come from a time and place in which all these things are in some extended 
sense part of my world, I do not think I carry all of them as part of my 
personal intellectual baggage, and certainly not all in the same way. If I 
did I would be as exhausted as Maurice Bloch feels when he contemplates the 
feverish trendiness of American academic life. 
Pursuing this point about trendiness, I want to agree with Bloch that one of 
the general problems with the theory paper is that it portrays the various 
earlier forms of anthropology as more dead or out of fashion than, for better 
or for worse, they really are. In my own defense, the point of lining things 
up in linear fashion was to show the ways in which new developments 
represented responses to past configurations of the theoretical landscape. 
Further, I think it is the case that the relative dominance, if not the 
presence or absence, of certain schools has shifted in more or less the ways 
the paper describes, at least in the United States. And finally, I did try to 
show in later sections of the paper the ways in which older schools of thought 
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were being transformed rather than jettisoned. But this last point was 
probably insufficiently stressed, and I would like to give it more emphasis 
today. I think everything I talked about in the paper (as well as several 
things that I didn't) are still alive and part of the current intellectual 
tool-kit, and I neither wish to abolish them, nor did I ever imagine that my 
words had the power to do so. 
Moving now to the list of keywords, I will begin with what is obviously the 
central term, "practice," and will reaffirm the claims made in the paper to 
the effect that "practice" both is and deserves to be a major symbol of 
current theoretical direction. 
So what is "practice?" I agree with Bloch that it is the most poorly defined 
term in the paper. While I do not wish to use up my response time giving a 
lecture on practice theory, it seems critical for further discussion to be as 
clear as I can in a short time. In the paper I said that any form of human 
action or interaction would be an instance of practice insofar as the analyst 
recognized it as reverberating with features of asymmetry, inequality, 
domination, etc. in its particular historical and cultural setting. The 
emphasis on the centrality of asymmetry and/or domination is one of the 
primary elements distinguishing current practice theories from older theories 
of social action, interaction, and transaction. Thus human activity regarded 
as taking place in a world of politically neutral relations is not "practice." 
To this minimal definition I would add the following: Practice is action 
considered in relation to structure; that is, in contrast to symbolic 
interactionism, say, structure is not bracketed analytically, but. is central 
to the analysis of action or practice itself. Practice emerges from 
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structure, it reproduces structure, and it has the capacity to transform 
structure. Human action considered apart from its structural contexts and 
its structural implications is not "practice." (MY emphasis on this point is 
not granted by Maurice Bloch, Tom Gibson or Pierre Bourdieu and I will come 
back to it later.) And finally I would add an optional third dimension: 
history. History is optional in the sense that Bourdieu's 9 2  
pf Practice is certainly an instance of practice theorizing (one could say he 
wrote the book on the subject), yet it is not historical. But I think it is 
only in historical context that one can see the relationship between practice 
and structure fully played out, and most current anthropological work 
utilizing practice theory is in fact historical. 
One other general point about "practice theories." A practice approach can be 
used to analyze quite a wide range of problems. In terms of published 
examples, we know it can be used to analyze statistical conformity and non- 
conformity to cultural rules, as when Bourdieu (1977) used it to explain the 
range of variation of conformity to marriage rules in Kabyle society. It can 
be used to analyze historical events, as when Sahlins (1981) used it to 
explain the occurrence and shape of certain very dramatic incidents in 
Hawaiian history. It can be used to analyze an existing configuration of a 
cultural system, as when I used it to explain the pattern of gender beliefs in 
traditional Polynesian society (1981). And it can be used to analyze 
structural transformation, as again in Sahlins' Hawaiian case, or in my own 
current work (1989) on the foundings of celibate monasteries among the Sherpas 
of Nepal in the early 20th century. 
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In all cases the general line of analytic attack is the same: to try to 
understand something the people did or do or believe, by trying to locate the 
point of reference in social practice from which the beliefs or actions 
emerge. This is not just a question of locating the actor's point of view, 
although that is a part of it. It is a question of seeking the configuration 
of cultural forms, social relations, and historical processes that moved 
people to act in ways that produced the effects in question. 
In order to be more specific, and also to return more directly to the 
panelists' criticisms, let me move on to the next keyword, "structure." In 
addition to referring to the panelists' comments, I will also refer briefly to 
points made in three papers published in 1986 in Comparative Studies 8g 
Societv and Historv: by Aram Yengoyan, Arjun Appadurai, and Ulf Hannerz, each 
responding at least nominally to "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties." 
"Structure" as a symbol appears to be the most hotly contested term on the 
list. Further, my discussion of structure seem to be the most prone to 
misreading of any of the discussions in the paper. It is almost as if the 
term practice could exist only in mutually exclusive relation to structure, 
such that if I talked about the importance of practice, I could not possibly 
have any appreciation of the presence, and the constraining force, of 
structure. Thus Tom Gibson, Maurice Bloch and Pierre Bourdieu fault me for 
not giving structure (in the sense of unconscious, collective ordering 
principles) its due; Ulf Hannerz suggested that I am insufficiently 
appreciative of social organization (in the more empirical sense); and my 
colleague Aram Yengoyan seemed to think I was recommending.abandoning the 
concept of culture. In each case this reading of my paper seems to stem 
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directly from a reaction to my expressed interest in actors and human agency; 
thus in the context of worrying that I pay too much attention to practice, 
Yengoyan accused me of promoting what he insisted on calling "behaviorism," 
Gibson accuses me of being a crypto-Freudian, and Bloch and (implicity) 
Bourdieu accuse me of turning back to transactionalism. 
I have already indicated rather firmly that my notion of practice is 
inextricably tied to a notion of structure. But in order to defend my 
original text for a moment, let me quote a brief section of it: 
The newer practice theorists...share a view that 'the system,' (in a 
variety of senses to be discussed below) does in fact have very 
powerful, even 'determining,' effects upon human action and the shape of 
events. Their interest in the study of action and interaction is thus 
not a matter of denying or minimizing this point, but expresses rather 
an urgent need to understand where 'the system' comes from - how it is 
produced and reproduced, and how it may have changed in the past or be 
changed in the future. As Giddens argues in his important recent book 
(central Problems...), the study of practice is not an antagonistic 
alternative to the study of systems or structures, but a necessary 
complement to it. (pp. 146-147). 
Somehow these assertions are not being heard. Let me then discuss briefly the 
way in which notions of "structure" operate in the context of a practice 
perspective. In general my point is that any of the standard notions of 
structure can be used in conjunction with a practice approach, but they will 
tend to undergo certain changes. Specifically, I would say that the image of 
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structure, of what structure would look like if you could see it, changes in 
the context of a practice perspective. Where in earlier representations 
structure looked like a building or a machine or an organism, or like one of 
those geometric spaces in La Pensee Sauvase, now it appears in forms that 
themselves contain an active assumption. Probably the clearest example of 
this point is Bourdieu's notion of babitus. Habitus is at one level structure 
in the Levi-Straussian sense, as is clear from those diagrams in Outline 
depicting the relations between wet and dry, up and down, inside and outside, 
male and female. Yet at the same time the image of structure in babitus is 
profoundly transformed by its theoretical linkage with practice. Thus it is 
structure that is doubly practiced: it is both lived in, in the sense of 
being a public world of ordered forms, and embodied, in the sense of being an 
enduring framework of dispositions that are stamped in and on actors' beings. 
I made a similar point in the paper when I contrasted Foucault's notion of 
discourse (which assumes a context of multiple unequal interactions) with 
established notions of culture, which assume an actor's point of view but do 
not assume the actor to be involved in any particular kind of interaction. 
Discourse is culture in motion as it were, both communicationally (within a 
certain kind of social/political field) and also historically, in the sense 
that discourses are portrayed as intrinsically more tranformable than what we 
think of as culture. 
And finally, my own recent work on Sherpa social and religious history 
utilizes a notion of cultural schemas, recurring stories that depict 
structures as posing problems, to which actors must and do find solutions. 
Here again structure (or culture) exists in and through its varying relations 
with various kinds of actors. Further, structure comes here as part of a 
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package of emotional and moral configurations, and not just abstract ordering 
principles. 
The point in all these examples is that - contrary to the assertions of Bloch, 
Gibson, and the others - practice approaches have very robust notions of 
structure, and of structural dynamics, forces, constraints, and outcomes. But 
the way in which structure is imaged, represented, and conceptualized is 
itself changing, as a result of its being conjoined with an equally robust 
notion of practice. If anything one can imagine the criticism coming from the 
opposite direction: that too much weight is still given to structural forces, 
and that the poor actor still has very little creativity in the historical 
process. Since none of the panelists raised this particular charge, I will 
not respond to it here, but it brings me to my third keyword, "actor." 
I will repeat first that the focus on actors in the context of contemporary 
practice theory is not a new form of either voluntarism or transactionalism. 
The actor is not viewed as a free agent, engaged in unconstrained creativity 
on the one hand or manipulation on the other. Rather the actor is recognized 
as being heavily constrained by both internalized cultural parameters and 
external material and social limits. Thus the central problem for practice 
theory is, as all its practitioners seem to agree, precisely the question of 
how actors who are so much products of their own social and cultural context 
can ever come to transform the conditions of their own existence, except by 
accident. 
Now in the paper I. complained that much of practice theory today, including 
some of my own work, tends to fall back on an interest theory view of actors: 
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actors are rational strategizers, seeking to maximize or at least optimize 
their own advantage. I said then, and I would still say now, that while such 
rational calculation is always a part of actors' intentions, it is never 
exhaustive of those intentions, and in many cases it is not even the dominant 
part. I said that we needed a more complex view of actors. 
Although at one level Tom Gibson's and Sharon Stephens' criticisms of. my paper 
come from radically different perspectives, at another level both arrive at 
the point that, instead of trying to theorize the actor from our own point of 
view, we must attend more to the ways in which actors are culturally 
constructed in different times and places. I agree very strongly that the 
historical and comparative study of the cultural construction of persons, and 
of the stuff (like motive, will, interest, intention) that move persons to 
act, is an enterprise of major importance. Indeed I just finished an entire 
book organized around the question of how various individuals in Sherpa 
society arrived in various ways at a certain configuration of felt need and 
active will at a certain moment in history. That is, I framed my history of 
the founding of the Sherpa monasteries as a question of the social, cultural, 
and historical construction of "interest". 
Yet at the same time I think we must recognize that an emphasis on the person 
as entirely a cultural product poses problems which are merely the inverse of 
the overly westernized actor. It evades the problem of adequately theorizing 
the actor, and leaves the scene to reductionist theories in which people are 
either overly rationally calculating or overly propelled by biological and/or 
psychological drives. It also has the potential for falling into what might 
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be called the Talcott Parsons effect, in which the only actors capable of 
changing the system are either deviants .or geniuses. 
The terms practice, structure, and actor, which I have scanned at an absurd 
speed, exhaust the central terms of practice theory as such. However, before 
moving to the other terms I intend to tackle today (reflexivity, history), I 
must attend to the two more general critiques made by the panelists concerning 
practice theory as a whole. On the one hand I have Bloch saying that practice 
theory is ok but that, in addition to the fact that Ortner doesn't do a very 
good job of laying it out, she fails to recognize that it has been around'for 
a very long time and thus falls into old traps and beats old dead horses. On 
the other hand I have Sharon Stephens saying that practice theory is already 
outmoded, embedded in old categories and modes of thought which must be 
transcended. I can only respond very briefly to each of these positions. 
First, I agree with Bloch that an interest in the relationship between human 
action and social transformation can be traced back quite a long way. It can 
be traced back strongly to both Marx and Weber though I will not review their 
positions here. But I disagree that there has been a serious attempt in 
modern social science, until this current body of so-called practice theory, 
to re-raise the issue. Instead we have had, as Bourdieu emphasizes in his 
comments, oscillations between overly structural and overly actor-focusing 
frameworks. The arguments between Levi-Strauss and Sartre are of course 
paradigmatic here, and I must say parenthetically that I find Bloch's and 
Gibson's attempt to cast Levi-Strauss as a thinker deeply concerned with the 
role of actors in history rather hard to wrap my mind around. In any event 
while I think one could Construct a syllabus on the problem of action and 
106 
structure, I do not think one could say that people have been consistently and 
self-consciously working on a synthesis in which, as in the present case, the 
two terms are given equal power. The problem is that even the attempted 
syntheses in the current situation get heard as one or another pole of the 
opposition. Mention the actor, and get heard as another form of 
transactionalism. Mention the importance of the cultural construction of 
anything at all, and get heard as another form of "culturology" or 
"subjectivism." Mention the importance of theorizing anything at all and get 
heard as another form of objectivism. Perhaps Bloch is right after all, and I 
am misreading other people's syntheses, locating them on one side or the 
other, as he is misreading the one that I have been trying to represent. I 
will come back to this point later, particularly with reference to the 
subjectivism/objectivism dichotomy. 
Coming from the other direction, Sharon Stephens questions "the possibility 
and desirability of developing a unified, general theory of practice at all." 
Instead she proposes that anthropologists rethink the concept of culture, "in 
order to explore and systematically compare very different modes of making and 
unmaking humanly constructed, historically developing worlds." Now it may be 
mischievous of me but it seems to me that this formulation, with its emphasis 
on "making and unmaking", is already paying some dues to a practice 
perspective. But more generally, as I indicated a moment ago in the 
discussion about actors, I would resist what I hear as a call, albeit a very 
sophisticated and eloquently argued call, for a new form of cultural 
particularism. I agree that different cultures construct actors, structure, 
and history very differently from our own, and that a-large- part of. our 
project is to understand this. But I disagree with the suggestion that "a 
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general theory of the system and its relation to practice [will] obscure 
rather than illuminate" these relations. On the contrary it seems to me that 
the examination of cultural constructions of persons, of social life, and of 
history, on the one hand, and of theories of What we call agents and systems 
on the other, take place most fruitfully in dialogue with one another. Indeed 
each alone tends to be a dead end. 
Turning now to the remaining two terms for my discussion, I will first take up 
what is usually referred to as reflexivity. Reflexive anthropology argues 
that both our categories of.analysis and our styles of writing-our'work- are 
warped by our own history and by the structures of capitalism and/or 
colonialism. Its practitioners urge us to focus on our own modes of 
representing other cultures, and to attempt to develop alternative modes that 
would somehow break through these distortive screens of thinking and writing. 
There are many things to say about this position, but for today I wish to make 
only one set of interrelated points, using the paper by Jane Collier and 
Sylvia Yanagisako as a way of focusing the issues. Specifically, I want to 
argue that reflexive anthropology has excluded feminist anthropology from its 
self-defined domain at some real cost to itself; that there is no good reason 
for this, and several bad ones; and that at least certain forms of feminist 
anthropology (as exemplified by Collier and Yanagisako among others) actually 
offers a more desirable and powerful model for incorporating the reflexivist 
insight into anthropological work. 
The exclusion of feminism from the key text collections of contemporary 
reflexive essays is rather extraordinary. There is a long passage in James 
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Clifford's introduction to Writins Culture in which he wrings his hands and 
says that he just can't figure out how feminism got left out of the book but 
somehow it just happened. 
Of course it is the case that there is a great deal of conventional social 
science work done from a feminist perspective. It is also the case that the 
feminist work that does challenge received categories of analysis does not do 
so primarily through experimentation with new forms of prose, discourse, and 
presentation. Nonetheless, there is a large body of feminist anthropology 
(including here works by Collier, Yanagisako, Michelle Rosaldo, Harriet 
Whitehead, and with all due humility 0rtner) which could reasonably be 
classified as reflexive, and which has been operating in that mode for a good 
15 or so years. Collier and Yanagisako exemplify the point nicely, prying open 
from a feminist perspective our assumptions about the relationship between the 
practical and the symbolic, production and reproduction, collective and 
individual interest, and even that old sacred cow, the sacred and the profane. 
Other arenas in which feminists have argued that we have fundamentally mis- 
read and mis-written the natives, because we have been trapped in our own 
categories, include the debate over the universality of male dominance, and 
the debate over the meaning of equality in so-called egalitarian societies. 
Up to this point, feminists (or at least the not insignificant subset that 
have concerned themselves with these issues) and reflexivists have been going 
down the same track, arguing that the discoveries of ethnographic research 
must be allowed to return to subvert our analytic categories and to transform 
the lenses through which we look at our own and other societies. Thus both 
are analogously suspicious of attempts to translate native categories directly 
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into theoretical terms. But they handle this suspicion differently, and this 
is where they very decisively part ways. The reflexivists' diffidence toward 
the native categories leads them to seek new and experimental modes of 
representation, which would allow the native categories to be heard through 
and around the distortions of social science discourse. The analytic emphasis 
comes to rest heavily on these representational modes, and on the history and 
practices of our own tradition that have generated these modes. In the most 
problematic extreme, ethnography loses all intrinsic justification, becoming 
merely a moment in the Western intellectuals' project of self-understanding. 
The feminists' diffidence toward the native categories leads them in quite the 
opposite direction. They criticize unselfconscious analytic work as a way of 
illuminating our own ideologized categories much as the reflexivists do. But 
they make this a moment in a fundamentally ethnosra~hic project, in which both 
other cultures and our own are eauallv subject to critical analysis. This may 
be done in a variety of ways, although again one of the dominant styles of 
analysis is currently a variety of practice analysis, in which native 
categories are illuminated by setting them in local contexts of social 
practice and the production of meaning. Such work thus sustains (one could 
also say it anticipated) the central critical insight of reflexive 
anthropology. But it puts this insight back into the effort of analysis and 
interpretation of cultures (including our own), and does not privilege either 
our representational styles, or the history and ethnography of our own 
society, as the primary objects of anthropological attention. 
I turn finally to my last major category for today, "history." Maurice Bloch 
faults me for neglecting it in the theory paper, and says that "it is much 
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more in the new rapprochement between anthropology and history that the really 
exciting things seem to be happening." I would agree, and would note again 
that I have just finished a work of historical anthropology myself. But the 
general area of historical anthropology contains at the moment one of the 
sharpest oppositions in the field: that between the so-called political 
economy approach (as exemplified most recently in the work of Eric Wolf, 
Sidney Mintz, Richard Fox, and others), and what I think some people are 
starting to call structural history but what I will call the histographic 
(i.e., historical-ethnographic) approach (this would include works by many of 
the practice theorists discussed earlier, but also works like Geertz's Neaara, 
Bloch's own recent book on Malagasy history and ritual, Kelly's Nuer Conquest 
and so forth). In the political economy approach, as I characterized it, the 
analytic emphasis is on impingement of external forces on the society in 
question. For the histographers, on the other hand, the emphasis is on 
internal developmental dynamics of the society. Three years ago, in the 
theory paper, I called attention to the opposition between these two 
contemporary schools, and in some quarters the opposition has been getting 
sharper since then. 
There are certain historical reasons for the current antagonistic relations 
between the two schools. As I indicated in the paper, the relationship is in 
many ways a continuation of that between symbolic anthropology and cultural 
ecology in the sixties, even including continuity of many key players. But 
there are also many more terms of shared perspective between the two schools 
than there were 20 years ago, and this needs to be noted first today. In 
,particular, there is a wing of the histography camp that takes a good deal of 
its inspiration from Marx, as do the political economists, and here the 
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similarities between the two schools are at least as striking as the 
differences. Their parallel commitments to a historical perspective is of 
course one point of commonality. Further, the histography side is much more 
interpretively and analytically critical than it used to be, whether in a 
strict Marxist sense, or simply in the sense of attention to more broadly 
defined structures of domination. And finally, it seems to me that the 
histographers have largely accepted the necessity for considering the impact 
of external political/economic forces on a society's history and culture. 
This is a real shift from the '60's, when the external forces in question were 
those of the natural environment, which most of the people now doing 
histography wouldn't touch with a ten foot pole. 
The histographic anthropologists, however, still seek much more extensively to 
show the way in which the impact of external forces is internally mediatea, 
not only by social structural arrangements (acknowledged as important by the 
political economists as well) but also by cultural patterns and structures of 
various kinds. This strong emphasis by the histographers, both Marxist and 
non-Marxist, on the importance of cultural mediation, reinterpretation, and 
transformation of outside forces is probably the main point of difference 
between the two schools at this time, and it brings us back to the old 
subjectivist/objectivist controversies of the 60's. Here we are hearing the 
old familiar name calling. The political economists (e.g., R. Fox, Lions ad 
the ~uniab) accuse the histographers of "culturology," of a form of idealism 
or mentalism that does not recognize the real world. The histographers accuse 
the political economists of ethnocentrically projecting their notions of 
agency and social action into other times and places, calling it the real 
world when it is only their own unrecognized image of it. I find this all 
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very depressing, particularly since I thought we had beaten that particular 
horse to death some time ago. 
Perhaps I should have taken my own comments in my '84 paper more seriously, 
when I said that this opposition, and others that are linked to it, may be too 
deeply rooted in the practices of our trade to be got rid of. Bourdieu 
reiterates the point today. 
As I have pondered the problems in writing these remarks, I have come to the 
conclusion that we will never mediate this opposition, because we have 
inappropriate notions of mediation. In the worst case, mediation appears as 
merging or synthesis, which everyone opposes, since all would lose their 
identities. In the intermediate case, mediation appears as a dual 
perspective, in which both sides accept the fact that the world is both 
subjectively and objectively constituted. I believe this view is correct, but 
I do not believe it can be sustained in practice, since the underlying 
opposition is posed precisely as an opposition, an either/or relation. 
Instead of trying to mediate, then, I urge acceDtance of this opposition, but 
within a controlling theoretical framework. And here I return to practice 
theory, which is in itself a theory of translation between an objective world 
and a subjective one, between a world constituted by logics beyond actors' 
perceptions, and a world constituted by logics spun by thinking and acting 
agents. Practice theory always has two moments, one largely objectivist and 
one largely subjectivist. In the first, the world appears as system and 
structure, constituting actors, or confronting them, or both, and here. we 
bring to bear all our objectivist methodologies. But in the second, the world 
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appears as culture, as symbolic frames derived from actors' attempts to 
constitute that world in their own terms by investing it with order, meaning, 
and value. 
Practice theory in fully developed form attends seriously to both of these 
.moments. But its special contributions lie in the ways in which it plays on 
the margins between them, examining those processes by which the one side is 
converted into the other. Thus we watch actors in real circumstances using 
their cultural frames to interpret and meaningfully act upon the world, 
converting it from a stubborn object to-a knowable and manageable life-place. 
At the same time we watch the other edge of this process, as actors' modes of 
engaging the world generate more stubborn objects (either the same or new 
ones) which escape their frames and, as it were, re-enter ours. Here 
subjective and objective are placed in a powerful and dynamic relationship, in 
which each side has equal, if temporary, reality, and in which it is precisely 
the relationship between the two that generates the interesting questions. 
At one level, then, the friction between histography and political economy 
represents perhaps the most problematic relationship in contemporary 
anthropology. At another level, however, it is perhaps the most hopeful area, 
in that it may force us finally to rethink and possibly resolve our most 
tenacious opposition, that between subjective and objective, emic and etic. 
And here I think practice theory offers real promise, since it embraces this 
opposition within itself, and theorizes it as a productive rather than a 
destructive relationship. 
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On this optimistic note, then, I will end my remarks. I would repeat here the 
point with which I started the theory paper: The worst enemy of our field is 
fragmentation and disengagement. The most important thing is that we keep 
talking to each other; preferably in civil terms, but I would still take name 
calling if the only choice were between name calling and silence. If I have 
made some small contribution to re-engaging the dialogue, then, I am delighted 
to have done so. 
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